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Abstract
Trust and reputation are key issues in the multi-agent systems domain. As in human
societies, software agents must interact with other agents in settings where there is
the possibility that they can be exploited. This suggests the need for theoretical and
computational models of trust and reputation that can be used by software agents,
and accordingly, much research has investigated this issue.
The first part of this thesis investigates the conjecture that agents who make
decisions in scenarios where trust is important can benefit from the use of a social
structure, representing the social relationships that exist between agents. To this
end, we present techniques that can be used by agents to initially build and then
progressively update such a structure in the light of experience. As the agents in-
teract with other agents they gather information about interactions and relationships
in order to build the network of agents and to better understand their social environ-
ment. We also show empirical evidence that a trust model enhanced with a social
structure representation, used to gather additional information to select trustworthy
agents for an agent’s interactions, can improve the trust model’s performance.
In the second part of this thesis, we concentrate on the context of coalition
formation. Coalition stability is a crucial issue. Stability is the motivation of an
agent’s refusal to break from the original coalition and form a new one. Lack of
trust in some of the coalition members could induce one agent to leave the coali-
tion. Therefore we address the current model’s limitation by introducing an abstract
framework that allows agents to form distrust-free coalitions. Moreover we present
measures to evaluate the trustworthiness of the agent with respect to the whole so-
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ciety or to a particular coalition. We also describe a way to combine the trust and
distrust relationships to form coalitions which are still distrust-free.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I turn up to give a lecture at 9 am on a Monday morning, trusting that
my students will attend; and they in turn reluctantly drag themselves
out of bed to attend, trusting that I will be there to give the lecture.
When my wife tells me that she will collect our children from school,
I expect to see the children at home that night safe and sound. Every
month, I spend money, trusting that on the last Thursday of the month,
my employer will deposit my salary in my bank account; and I trust my
bank to safeguard this money, investing my savings prudently. Some-
times, of course, my trust is misplaced. Students don’t turn up up to
lectures; my bank makes loans to people who have no chance of repay-
ing them, and as a consequence they go bankrupt, taking my savings
with them. But despite such disappointments, our lives revolve around
trust: we could hardly imagine society functioning without it.
Michael Wooldridge, Foreword from [21]
The sociologist Niklas Luhmann said “A complete absence of trust would prevent
one even getting up in the morning” [44]. Trust is pervasive in human societies.
It is necessary for many everyday tasks. Until the end of the nineties, trust was
1
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considered a notion appropriate only for human (or animal [14]) interactions and
widely studied by sociologists and anthropologists. However, the creation of the
Internet and the emergence of virtual societies has made trust a relevant research
topic for Computer Scientists [22]. Computer Science has moved from the pattern
of the isolated computer systems to the idea of a network of systems and distributed
computing. This evolution has several implications for the security models, the
policies and the mechanisms needed to protect users’ information and resources in
an increasingly interconnected computing infrastructure.
Similarly, Artificial Intelligence has moved to the idea of social, collective and
independent intelligence, with the creation of the paradigm of agents and multi-
agent systems [36]. For example, agents (computer systems)1 can now participate
in online auctions and negotiate on behalf of their owners. With this level of in-
dependence, agents need to be able to make decisions for themselves, including
those regarding honoring their commitments. In this context, risks associated with
mistrust and deception arise. Therefore, trust relationships need to be created in
virtual societies as well as human ones.
In this chapter we give an introduction to multi-agent systems, provide some
definitions of trust and describe the key contributions of this work.
1.1 Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
In this section, we provide some of the basic concepts of multi-agent systems,
which will be used throughout this work. First, we give a definition of an intelligent
autonomous agent:
An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment,
and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order
to meet its delegated objectives [70].
In this work, we assume that all the agents are rational. As defined in [61],
for each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is
1More details on agents will be provided in the next section.
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expected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the
percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has.
From the agent definition, a number of properties can be elaborated to better
describe what capabilities are required for an agent to be intelligent [70]:
• Reactivity: Intelligent agents are able to perceive their environment, and
respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it in order to satisfy their
design objectives.
• Proactiveness: Intelligent agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour
by taking the initiative in order to satisfy their design objectives.
• Social ability: Intelligent agents are capable of interacting with other agents
(and possibly humans) in order to satisfy their design objectives.
As the social ability property shows, it is clear that most of the problems dele-
gated to agents require the interaction among multiple agents. A multi-agent sys-
tem is a system containing multiple agents interacting together typically in order
to solve problems that are beyond the capabilities of any individual agent [70]. In
an open multi-agent system, agents can be owned by different organisations and
may have common, complimentary or conflicting goals. Moreover, they can join
or leave the community at any time. Therefore an open multi-agent system has the
following properties [12]:
• Dynamism: Services provided in the society might become unavailable or
the prices of products can change over time due to agents leaving the com-
munity or new agents joining it.
• Openness: As agents can join or leave any time, the number of agents in the
society is not fixed.
• Insecurity: In the system, there may be incompetent, unreliable, or even
malicious agents. Moreover, agents are self-interested, therefore, each agent
is responsible for security, and does not rely on some global or special au-
thority.
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• Distributed: It is not practical for agents to rely on access to global system
information, therefore no agent knows everything about the environment.
Constant and completely reliable communication would be required to allow
even one agent to obtain global information, and the computational costs
required to create the global viewpoint often would exceed any performance
improvements.
In such environments, trust can play a role as important as it assumes in human
societies.
1.2 Definition of Trust
So far, we have related the notion of trust with scenarios that involve decision
making in which the actions of different entities are relevant, but not known in
advance. However, trust does not have a single unique accepted definition.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as confidence, strong belief, in
the goodness, strength, reliability of something or somebody. According to Marsh
[45], most research on trust has come from three areas: sociology, psychology and
philosophy. Marsh also describes four researchers as major contributors to this
work: Morton Deutsch, Niklas Luhmann, Bernard Barber and Diego Gambetta.
Deutsch’s definition [25] implies that trust is dependent on individuals and their
perceived cost and benefits analysis of the given scenario, while Luhmann [44]
argues that the concept of trust is a means of reducing complexity in society, when
facing a decision. Barber [10] also links trust with society and cultures but not with
an individual’s perceived value of cost and benefits as in Deutsch’s ideas. He links
trust with expectation about the future.
The most interesting definition, from a computer science point of view, is Gam-
betta’s [9]. He defined trust as follows:
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group
of agents will perform a particular action, both before it can monitor
such action (or independently of its capacity ever to be able to monitor
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it) and in a context in which it affects its own action. When we say we
trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that
the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at
least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging
in some form of cooperation with him.
Correspondingly, when we say that someone is untrustworthy, we im-
ply that the probability is low enough for us to refrain from doing so.
With this definition, trust opens itself to be modelled mathematically and so it
becomes more concrete than abstract compared to the other definitions. Moreover,
this definition makes trust quantifiable. Trust is modelled as a probability, there-
fore it has a range from 0 to 1, where 0 is complete distrust and 1 is blind trust.
Blind trust is an example of complete trust where one agent has complete trust in
another regardless of the circumstances. Actions are dependent on this probability
and those situations where trust in someone has no influence on our decisions are
excluded.
This definition leads to the consideration that trust is relevant only when there
is a possibility of deception. When someone is not completely trusted, there is a
chance that the action he performs may be non-beneficial to us. This deception
could be intentional, when actions are malicious but also caused by incompetence,
carelessness or superficiality.
Moreover Gambetta’s definition relates trust with cooperation or in general
when any sort of interaction between agents occurs.
The lack of trust represents a real obstacle in many situations, from building
personal relationships in human life to the establishment of on-line services or au-
tomatic transactions. Lack of trust also means having to make an effort and spend
time to protect ourselves against deceit.
In contrast, trust promotes cooperation. It enables people to interact efficiently
and similarly for companies and other organizations. Therefore a high level of trust
is very attractive for the wealth of the community. On the other hand, the ability not
to trust helps to avoid harm when faced with unreliable and unscrupulous persons.
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Undoubtedly, trust has an important role in guiding people through uncertainty and
risks.
The study of trust and reputation has many applications. Trust and reputa-
tion systems have been considered as key factors in the success of electronic com-
merce [7]. These systems are used as mechanisms to search for reliable partners
but also to decide whether to honor contracts or not. They are also used as trust-
enforcing, deterrent, and incentive mechanisms to avoid cheaters and frauds. But
e-markets are not the only area of application. Trust has been used also as a way to
improve belief revision mechanisms [11] or in cooperation and teamwork [71, 38]2
in multi-agent systems.
Gambetta’s definition relates trust with cooperation, since cooperation requires
some level of trust. In fact, if trust is only unilateral or there is complete distrust be-
tween agents then there cannot be any cooperation. A higher level of trust generally
leads to a higher probability of cooperation.
It can be argued that blind trust can make cooperation successful since there
is no possibility of distrust, but, it is important to note that blind trust could be an
incentive to deceive. Consider the well-known game from game-theory Prisoner’s
Dilemma [8]:
In its classical form, the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is presented as follows (from
wikipedia):
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for
a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the
same deal. If one confess and testifies (defects) for the prosecution against the
other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice
receives the full 10 year sentence. If both remain silent (cooperate), both prisoners
are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the
other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the
other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about
2For a wider reading on the problem of learning cooperative strategies in competitive settings,
see [47, 16].
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act?
In the game, regardless of what the opponent chooses, each prisoner always
receives a lesser sentence by confessing and betraying the other prisoner. Suppose
that Prisoner A thinks that Prisoner B will cooperate. This means that Prisoner A
could cooperate as well, getting just the six months sentence, or he could defect,
getting, in this case, the freedom. So it pays for Prisoner A to confess, therefore
defect, if he thinks Prisoner B will cooperate staying silent. In the other case,
suppose that Prisoner A thinks that Prisoner B will defect. Therefore, it is better
for Prisoner A to defect as well, otherwise it would get a 10 years sentence.
Hence, it is better for Prisoner A to defect if he thinks Prisoner B will cooperate
AND it is better for Prisoner A to defect if he thinks Prisoner B will defect. So,
Prisoner A can accurately say, No matter what Prisoner B does, I personally am
better off confessing than staying silent. Therefore, for my own sake, I should
defect. However, if the other player thinks similarly, then they both defect and
confess and both get a higher sentence (lower payoff) than they would get by both
staying silent. Rational self-interested decisions result in each prisoner being worse
off. They would both benefit by staying silent but they can’t because if one stays
silent the other one would benefit by confessing. Hence the dilemma.
The fundamental issue here is trust, as it is assumed that the two prisoners
cannot communicate with each other. If one player could be sure the opponent
chooses to remains silent (cooperates), which implied blind trust, then it would be
its rational choice to defect leading it to go free. However, it is clear that they both
could have got away with only six months each if they had been able to mutually
trust each other to cooperate.
The prisoner’s dilemma is an excellent example of how taking trust into account
means a better result for the whole community and for the individual agent, but it
also shows how blind trust could be exploited and therefore cooperation might not
be successful.
Section 2 will provide a more detailed classification of various aspects of trust.
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1.3 Overview and Main Contribution
The work in this thesis contributes to the trust research state of the art in two areas.
Although the contributions in this thesis can be divided in two parts, they have a
common target. The ultimate goal of the whole research is to allow agents to make
better choices of the partners to interact with.
The first part of this work is related to the area of computational trust and repu-
tation 3 models. We present a methodology to combine concepts of social network-
ing and trust relationships to enhance a computational trust model oriented to those
environments where social relations play an important role.
Social network analysis is the study of social relationships between individuals
in a society, defined as a set of methods specifically developed to allow research and
analysis of the relational sides of these structures [35]. In the multi-agent systems
context, social structure analysis can play a vital role. The research in [66] asserts
that the social ties created by social networks influence member behaviour through
perceived social gains and rewards for themselves. In particular, social networks
allow agents to strategically revise their relations. Similarly, our work tries to give
better information for the agents on which to base their strategic decisions.
Although the idea of considering social relations has been previously studied,
little attention has been given to the practicability of the models, neglecting to
formulate how agents can gather information about these social relations. With
this research, we attempt to overcome this limitation. The main characteristics of
our contribution can be summarised as follows:
• Presenting a method for an agent to build a social network representation of
their local environment;
• Using interaction information such as directed interaction or reputation in-
formation to update such representations;
• Providing an implementation of such representations of the social structure;
3A definition of reputation will be given in the next chapter
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• Presenting empirical evidence that a technique to build and maintain a social
network representation of the environment allows a trust model to be more
effective in trustworthy partner selection.
As mentioned in the previous Section, trust and reputation have been consid-
ered key factors for the success of electronic commerce systems. For instance,
reputation is widely used in electronic markets, such as for instance Ebay [60] and
Amazon, as trust-enforcing, deterrent or incentive mechanisms to avoid cheaters
and deception. The work carried out in this first part is presented in Chapters 3
and 4.
Another area of application in agent technology is teamwork and cooperation.
In this area we can find extensive research about coalition formation techniques.
The second part of this work concentrates on using trust as a factor in coalition
formation models.
Cooperation is the foundation of multi-agent systems, allowing agents to in-
teract to achieve their goals. Coalition stability is a crucial problem. If agents do
not trust the other components of the coalition, they could break away from the
alliance. Therefore, trust plays an important role for coalition stability.
Existing models of coalition formation use information about reputation and
trust to rank agents according to their level of trustworthiness, therefore only con-
sidering a view of a single agent referred toward a particular target agent it wants
to interact with. Hence, these models are inherently local: they lack a global view.
In this part of our research, we address this limitation.
The main characteristics of the contribution regarding this part of our work can
be summarised as follows:
• Offering a global view on trust and coalition formation;
• Providing a formal framework, ATF (Abstract Trust Framework) to consider
trust in coalition formation;
• Providing a way to form satisfying coalitions for all the members, with regard
to the trustworthiness of agents;
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• Providing several notions of mutually trusting coalitions;
• Providing an actual illustration and analysis of the models proposed.
The work carried in this part is presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
1.4 Publications
This thesis includes work that has been published in the following papers:
• Elisabetta Erriquez, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (2010) Build-
ing and Using Social Structures in Agent ART. In the 13th International
Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies, May 10-14, 2010 Toronto, Canada.
• (To appear) Elisabetta Erriquez, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge
(2011) Building and Using Social Structures: A Case Study using the Agent
ART Testbed. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
(TIST)
• Elisabetta Erriquez, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge (2011) An
abstract framework for reasoning about trust. In: The 10th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiagentSystems (AAMAS-11).
May 2-6, 2011 Taipei, Taiwan.
• Elisabetta Erriquez, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge(2011) An ab-
stract framework for reasoning about trust. In the 14th International Work-
shop on Trust in Agent Societies, May 2-6, 2011 Taipei, Taiwan.
• (To appear) Elisabetta Erriquez, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge.
A formal analysis of trust and distrust relationships in Shakespeare’s Othello.
In F. Paglieri, L. Tummolini, R. Falcone & M. Miceli (Eds.), The goals of
cognition. Essays in honor of Cristiano Castelfranchi. London: College
Publications.
The work presented in the first three papers is illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4,
while the work presented in the last three papers is illustrated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 attempts to define trust and reputation, and reviews the state of art
on the current approaches to modelling trust in agent systems and in coalition
formation. It also summarises the open issues.
• Chapter 3 presents a method for agents to build a social network represen-
tation of their local environment.
• Chapter 4 describes the methodology and the test settings used to evaluate
our approach. It also provides an analysis of the results.
• Chapter 5 presents ATF, the abstract framework devised in this research to
allow trustworthy coalition formation.
• Chapter 6 presents an extension to our ATF model, allowing the use of both
trust and distrust relations.
• Chapter 7 uses Othello, the famous tragedy by Shakespeare, to give an il-
lustration and analysis of the models proposed.
• Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and outlines the directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Trust
Just as in human societies, sofware agents have their own objectives. The most
rational strategy for an agent is to maximize its own return. Often, agents must
interact with other agents in settings where there is the possibility that they can
be exploited. This suggests the need for computational models of trust and rep-
utation that can be used by software agents, and accordingly, much research has
investigated this issue over the past decade.
This Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 will present a classification of
the various types of trust identified in the literature. Section 2.2 presents a review
on the main computational approaches to model trust and reputation. Section 2.3
reports problems influencing the effectiveness of the trust models presented and
highlights open issues that need to be addressed and the requirements for this re-
search. Finally, Section 2.5 presents a survey of the state of art regarding coalition
formation models which consider trust as a factor.
2.1 Trust Classification
On a general level, there are two main approaches to deal with trust [59]:
1. Individual-level trust, whereby an agent has some beliefs about the honesty
or the potential behavior of its interaction partner;
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2. System-level trust, in which the agents in the system are forced to be trust-
worthy by rules or protocols that regulate the system, like, for example, in
auctions, voting, contract-nets or market mechanisms.
The first approach provides each agent with a model to reason about certain fea-
tures of their counterpart in order to make decisions about their reliability, honesty
and so on. This approach allows the agents to calculate a measure of trust they can
put in the counterpart. A high degree of trust towards an agent means that the agent
is likely to be chosen as an interaction partner. A low degree of trust means that
the agent would probably not be selected or that the counterpart agent would adopt
a different strategy to deal with an untrustworthy agent. Therefore, the purpose of
the first approach is to lead the agent to decisions such as how and whom to interact
with.
The second main approach is based on the design of mechanisms or norms that
govern the interactions between agents. These mechanisms need to ensure that
if the agents behave correctly then they will gain some utility whereas malicious
agents will loose utility or be penalised. Therefore, these protocols must guarantee
that the agents will have no better option than interacting honestly with each other.
In this thesis we focus on the first approach; for more details about the second
approach see [59].
It is possible to classify trust models according to the information sources they
use to calculate their trust values. Direct and indirect interactions are the most
common source of information used in most computational models [40, 63, 67, 74,
45, 65]. Recently, attention has been given to information related to sociological
aspect of agents’ interactions. Using multiple sources of information can help to
reduce uncertainty in different situations [57].
Direct Trust We refer to the value obtained from the analysis of direct interac-
tions as direct trust. On a general level, direct interactions are, undoubtedly, the
most reliable source of information for a trust model. All computational trust mod-
els use this type of information. This information is based on observations made by
an agent a about its past interaction with a particular agent b. These observations
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are reflected in agent a’s opinion of agent b’s behaviours and used to predict how b
will behave in future interactions.
In this category, we can also include information deriving from observable in-
teractions between other agents. However, in most scenarios, this type of infor-
mation is rarely available since interactions among other agents are not publicly
visible.
Indirect Trust We refer to the value obtained from the analysis of information
from indirect interactions (interactions between two other agents) as indirect trust.
Indirect information, also called witness or reputation information or recommenda-
tions, is the information coming from other agents in the society. This information
is normally based on the witnesses own direct interaction but it can also be based
on other indirect interactions.
Indirect information is normally easy available, however it carries a degree of
uncertainty that the information based on direct experience does not have. It is
not uncommon that agents manipulate or hide information for their own benefit.
For this reason, indirect information is not ready to use as direct information but
requires additional processing in order to be used in computational trust models.
Reputation is built on observations of an agent’s past behaviour. This includes
evaluations collected from other agents in the society. Every agent has a personal
point of view, and so the values may be recorded in different ways. Aggregating
these values presents difficulties that are not examined in this thesis 1.
Direct trust and reputation have a close relationship. Direct trust in an agent
is formed based on observations made by the agent after direct interactions. The
reputation of an agent is constructed from observations of other agents about their
own direct interactions (provided that the observations are reported accurately).
Therefore, direct trust can be seen as reputation at a local level.
In multi-agent systems, reputation can be useful when there are a large number
of agents interacting (for example, online auctions or stock-trading). Reputation
enables buyers, for instance, to choose the best seller (based on ratings about previ-
ous interactions) in the system. Therefore, reputation can induce sellers to be well
1For more information, see [59].
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behaved if they think that a low reputation value will cause buyers to avoid them.
Reputation is also a useful source of information to form an initial trust between
agents who have not yet interacted directly.
Social Trust We refer to the value obtained from the analysis of social informa-
tion about the agents’ society as social trust.
Reputation can be considered a social concept, however there are several other
social relationships that affect an agent’s reputation. For example, belonging to
a government office may imply high trustworthiness of the information the agent
provides. Moreover, the kind of social interactions between agents can help to
determine the trustworthiness of the reported information. Therefore, we can dis-
tinguish two types of social relationships: the type based on the role the agent
has in the society and the ones whose type is inferred from the interactions be-
tween two agents. The first type is usually publicly known by all the agents and
it reflects initial roles or membership of an agent in a particular organization, for
example, company employee. The second type emerges during interaction between
agents, reflecting a certain type of relationship, for example a supplier or frequent
buyer [40].
Another source of information proposed by some researchers [40] is a trusted
third party, a sort of authority that supplies information about agents when required.
This information is considered to be honest and reliable. However, in the majority
of scenarios, this kind of information is rarely available.
Social information is important to allow the agent form a richer view of its
environment so that it is more likely to make good decisions in terms of whom to
trust and whom to ask for recommendations.
2.2 Computational Trust and Reputation Models
In recent years, many different computational trust and reputation models have
been presented, all with their own characteristics. In this section we present a
selection of these models in order to provide an overview of the area.
One of the earliest computational trust model is the one proposed by Marsh
[45]. The model takes into account only direct interactions. It distinguishes three
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types of trust:
1. Basic trust, which models the general trusting disposition independently of
whom the agent is interacting with. It is calculated from all the experiences
accumulated by the agent. Good experiences lead to a greater disposition to
trust, and vice versa.
2. General trust, which is the trust that one agent has toward another without
considering any specific situation. It simply represents general trust of the
other agent.
3. Situational trust, which is the trust that one agent has in another one taking
into account a specific situation. The utility, the importance of the situation
and the General trust contribute to calculate the Situational trust.
In order to define the overall value, the author proposes three methods: the
mean, the maximum and the minimum. Also, three different types of agents are
defined: the optimistic (which uses the maximum trust value from the range of ex-
periences it has had), the pessimistic (which uses the minimum trust value), and
the realistic (which uses a value calculated as the average over a certain set of situ-
ations). These trust values are used to help an agent to decide whether to cooperate
or not with another agent. Besides trust, the decision mechanism also considers
the importance of the action to be performed, the risk associated with the situation,
and the perceived competence of the target agent. To calculate the risk and the
perceived competence, the three types of trust (basic, general, and situational) are
used. In this way, the model tries to bring into the calculation other factors affecting
the decision of the agent to trust his partner.
Marsh’s model is considered the first prominent, comprehensive, formal, com-
putational model of trust. His intent was to address an imperfect understanding,
a plethora of definitions, and informal use in the literature and in everyday life
with regard to trust. However, his model is often simplified due to the difficulty of
finding values for some variables used to compute trust (for example, importance,
utility, competence, risk, etc.).
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Online reputation models, such as the ones used by Ebay [60] or Amazon are
based on the ratings that users perform after the completion of a transaction. The
user can give three possible values: positive (1), negative (−1) or neutral (0). The
reputation value is computed as the sum or the mean of those rating over a certain
period of time.
The Sporas system [74] extends the reputation model of Ebay using a new
formula to calculate the amount of change of the reputation value according to the
new rating value. Sporas only considers the most recent rating between two users.
Users with very high reputation values perceive smaller rating changes after each
update than users with a low reputation. To take into account the reliability of
such values, Sporas uses a measure of reliability based on the standard deviation of
reputation values.
Models of this type are based on a centralised approach and are not suitable for
open multi-agent systems, where there is no central authority.
The Histos model [74] is an enhancement to Sporas that takes into account the
group dynamics as in Regret [63]. In particular, Histos looks at the links between
users (in a social network) to deduce personalised reputation values, to deal with
the lack of personalization of reputation values that Sporas had. This enables an
agent to assemble ratings from those it trusts already rather than those it does not
know. The ratings are represented as a directed graph where nodes represent agents
and edges carry information on the most recent reputation rating given by one agent
to another. The root node represents the agent owner of the graph. The reputation
of an agent at level x of the graph is calculated recursively as a weighted mean of
the rating values that agents in level x− 1 gave to that agent. The weights are the
reputation values of the agents that rate the target agent. The agents who have been
rated directly by the owner of the graph have a reputation value equal to the rating
value. This is the base case of the recursion. The model also limits the length
and number of paths that are taken into account for the calculation. However, the
reputation value does not depend on the context and no special mechanisms are
provided to deal with cheaters.
Both Histos and Sporas have been shown to be robust to collusion. This is
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because ratings from those agents that are badly rated themselves have a diminished
effect on the reputation of others and those they might want to protect. However, as
the authors point out themselves, the major drawback is that users are reluctant to
give bad ratings to their trading partners. This is because the model is not incentive-
compatible, and so agents have no incentive to give ratings in the first place.
The model proposed by Yu and Singh [19] tries to deal with absence of in-
formation. The main contribution of their work is the aggregation of information
obtained from referrals while coping with a lack of information. The model is
based on witness information and has a mechanism to locate information sources
based on the individual agent’s knowledge. Each agent in the system has a list of
agents it knows and their associated expertise. When the agent needs information,
it can send a query to a number of agents in its list, who will try to answer the query
if they can. In case they cannot, the agents will send back a list of other agents who
they believe could answer the query. This constitutes the referral system.
Yu and Singh use the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence to model information
the agent retrieves [73]. When an agent does not receive any rating (good or bad),
Yu and Singh’s model considers this a lack of belief (or disbelief) therefore a state
of uncertainty (where all beliefs have an equal probability of being true). Demp-
ster’s rule allows beliefs obtained from various sources to be combined to support
the evidence that a particular agent is trustworthy or not. Moreover, the agent holds
a local belief about the trustworthiness of another related to its direct interaction
with that particular agent. In these cases, ratings obtained from witnesses are dis-
carded. However, Yu and Singh do not deal with the possibility that an agent may
lie about its rating of another agent. They assume all witnesses are totally trust-
worthy even if an agent could obtain some benefit by lying about their rating of an
opponent.
With regard to the problem of deceitful witnesses, Schillo et al. [65] propose a
possible solution. They propose a Prisoner’s Dilemma set of games with a partner
selection phase. Each agent receives the results of the game it has played plus
the information about the games played by a subset of all players (its neighbors).
As a result, the agent can have an impression of the partner’s honesty based on
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the behavior they exhibited according to the normal Prisoner’s Dilemma actions
(cooperation or defection). An interesting feature of this model is the use of a data
structure called TrustNet to store third party information to complement the results
from the initial phase. This structure is similar to the graph used by Histos [74]. In
fact, the TrustNet is a directed graph where nodes represent agents and edges carry
information about the observation that the parent node has referred to the owner of
the TrustNet about the child node.
While Yu and Singh’s model shows the effectiveness of referrals and Dempster
Shafer’s theory in modelling reputation, Schillo’s model illustrates how witness
information can be used to reason effectively against lying agents. These models,
however, although make use a social network, they simplify direct interactions and
fail to frame such interactions within the social setting with regards to the type of
relationships that exist between the witnesses and the potential interaction partners.
To overcome this limitation, Sabater and Sierra [63] adopt a sociological ap-
proach closer to real-life scenarios within their model called Regret. Their reputa-
tion value, which represents the trust to be placed in the counterpart, is a weighted
sum of subjective opinion derived from direct interactions, the group opinion of the
opponent and the agent’s opinion of the opponent’s group. These last two opinions
compose the social dimension of reputation. Although Regret takes into account
the possibility of dishonest reports, it assumes that agents are willing to share their
opinions about one another. This model is interesting because it tries to frame
the interactions between agents within the social setting, using social relations to
overcome the lack of information that the agents may face. Regret uses the social
network to find groups of witnesses, to decide which witnesses will be consulted,
and how to weigh those witnesses’ opinions. Regret also uses the concepts of
neighborhood reputation and system reputation, which are calculated using fuzzy
rules from the reputation of the target’s neighbor agents. Finally, the system also
makes use of information regarding the social role of the agent in the society, for
example seller, buyer, etc.
However, this is useful only if the information based on the particular domain is
available. In fact, Sabater and Sierra assume that this information is always avail-
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able to the agent. In Regret, each agent owns a series of so called sociograms, a
representations of the social network in the form of a graph, which describes rela-
tionships between all the agents in the society. One of the limitations of the Regret
model is the fact that it is not shown how each agent can build the sociograms that
they use in their trust computations.
The Fire model [40] tries to overcome this limitation using a referral system
similar to the one used by Yu and Singh. The model integrates a number of infor-
mation sources to produce a comprehensive assessment of an agent’s likely perfor-
mance in open systems. Specifically, in order to provide trust metrics, Fire uses
four measures:
• interaction trust, or direct trust, as defined in section 2.1, which is a trust
value based on previous direct interaction with the agent it wants to assess;
• role-based trust, which is a value based on the particular context the agent is
operating in;
• witness reputation, or indirect trust, as defined in section 2, which is a trust
value based on information from other agents;
• and certified reputation, a reliable trust value provided by a third trusted part,
if available.
These four measures are calculated by different modules in the system, and
combined together to produce a comprehensive assessment. The modularity of
the system allows the agent to be able to produce a trust value even in absence of
information from a particular module. For instance, if agent a has not yet inter-
acted directly with agent b, the Fire system could still produce a trust assessment
based on the measure for the other modules. A key part of this model is the use
of references (endorsements of trust from other agents), which are used when no
reputation or other sources of trust exist. This feature enables Fire to provide a trust
metric in cases where other models fail to produce an assessment because of lack
of information about a particular agent.
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However, one limitation of the model is the assumption that all the agents will
be always willing to share information and that they will never lie in doing so. In
real scenarios, this assumption might be too strong. Moreover, Fire does not use the
social context as the Regret model does. Fire does not evaluate interactions within
the context of the social relationships existing between all the parts involved, for
example, the witness agents, the target agent and the agent itself.
2.3 Issues of Trust Models
After the analysis of the trust and reputation models presented in the previous sub-
section, there are some considerations to be made.
Most approaches use a mathematical-based design for their trust model and
some also inherit concepts from game theory. The main sources of information
used are the direct interactions and information from third party agents from indi-
rect interactions. There are only few models [63, 40, 30] using other aspects of the
interactions to enrich the values of trust and reputations calculated. We agree with
Sabater and Sierra [63] that a good mechanism to increase the efficiency of trust
and reputation models is the introduction of sociological aspects as part of these
models. It is this aspect of interactions between agents that we concentrate on in
the first part of this thesis.
Beside the general issues of calculating trust and reputations measures, there
are other issues that can affect the performance of a trust model. These comprise
the correlated evidence problem and the dynamism of open multi-agent systems.
The correlated evidence problem happens when the opinions of different wit-
nesses are based on the same event(s) or when there is a considerable amount of
shared information that tends to unify the witnesses’ way of thinking. In both cases,
the trust on the information shouldn’t be as high as the number of similar opinions
may suggest [63]. Sabater and Sierra use graph theoretic techniques to deal with
this problem. In this thesis, we used the same approach with a simplification on the
number of the sociograms used. More details are given in Section 3.
In an open multi-agent system, the number or behaviour of agents can change
at any time. New agents can enter the system and old agents can leave it at any
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time. This means that an agent needs to be able to continuously learn about new
agents and be aware that a previous interaction partner may have left the environ-
ment. Moreover, relationships among agents may change due to changes in agents’
behaviour or role. Therefore, a previously trusted agent might become a liar or the
quality of its service might degrade due to different circumstances.
Given the possible dynamism of an open multi-agent system, a trust model
should be able to adapt itself to cope under these changes and function reasonably
consistently.
Regret [63] uses a social network to take into account different types of relation-
ships among agents and it also does not impose any constraints on the dynamism
of the system. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is assumed that
each agent already owns the sociograms used in the trust computations and it is not
shown how the agents can build or update the sociograms should any interaction
change the relationships among the agents. This means that agents have no tools
to update their network representation in cases such as an agent breaking a trust
relationship, or new agents appearing in the system.
In the first part of this thesis, we present techniques for agents to build a social
network representation of their local environment and maintain their own represen-
tation of such environments in case of changes. With this extended perception of
the environment, agents can make more informed decisions.
2.4 Testbed
In this paragraph we describe the Agent ART (Agent Reputation and Trust) testbed [34],
which has been used for the evaluation of the methodology proposed in this thesis.
The Agent ART Testbed initiative was launched with the goal of establishing
a testbed for agent reputation and trust related technologies. Although no longer
maintained, the ART Testbed is designed to serve in two roles:
• as a competition forum in which researchers can compare their technologies
against objective metrics, and
• as an experimental tool, with flexible parameters, allowing researchers to
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Figure 2.1: Game overview in the Agent ART Testbed from [33]
perform customizable, easily-repeatable experiments.
The Agent ART Testbed claims to be a versatile, universal experimentation
platform, which looks into relevant trust research problems and unites researchers
toward solutions via unified experimentation methods. The testbed provides met-
rics and tools that researchers can use for comparing and validating their approaches.
The testbed also serves as an objective means of presenting technology features,
both advantages and disadvantages, to the community.
A game in the Agent ART testbed is intended to support the comparison of
different strategies of agents as they act in combination. We decided to use the
Agent ART testbed as an experimental platform because it covers relevant trust re-
search problems and helps researchers find a unified solution. Moreover it provides
metrics through which it is possible to compare and validate different trust models.
The context of the testbed is the art appraisal domain, where agents function as
painting appraisers with varying levels of expertise in different artistic eras. Fig-
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ure 2.1 shows an overview of a game in the testbed. Clients request appraisals for
paintings from different eras; if an appraising agent does not have the expertise to
complete the appraisal, it can request opinions from other appraiser agents. Ap-
praisers receive more clients, and thus more profit, for producing more accurate
appraisals.
In what follows we provide a description of how a game in the Agent ART
Testbed is structured, as described in [33].
In each timestep, multiple clients present each appraiser (agent) with paintings
to be appraised, paying a fixed fee f for each appraisal request. To increase busi-
ness, appraisers attempt to evaluate paintings as closely to market value as possible.
A given painting may belong to any of a finite set of eras (a painting’s era is known
by all appraisers), and appraisers have varying levels of expertise in each era. An
appraiser’s expertise, defined as its ability to generate an “opinion” about the value
of a painting, is described by a normal distribution of the error between the ap-
praiser’s opinion and the true painting value. The agents do not know each other’s
expertise values.
Appraiser agents may also purchase from each other reputation information
about other appraisers. Appraiser agents must decide when, and from whom, to
request opinions and reputation information to generate accurate appraisals for
clients.
The simulation engine oversees each operation, including client requests, ap-
praiser opinion generation, transactions between appraisers, and returning final ap-
praisals to clients.
When an agent wishes to request an opinion about a particular painting, it
sends a request message to another agent (potential opinion provider), identify-
ing the painting to be appraised. Upon receiving an opinion request, if the poten-
tial provider is willing to provide the requested opinion, it responds by sending
a certainty assessment about the opinion it can provide, defined as a real number
between zero and one (one represents complete asserted certainty), based on its
expertise. The potential provider is not required to provide a truthful certainty as-
sessment. If the potential provider does not wish to participate in the requested
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transaction, it may choose to decline the request. By sending a certainty assess-
ment, the provider promises to deliver the requested opinion should the certainty
assessment be accepted by the requester. After receiving the provider’s certainty as-
sessment, the requester either sends payment to the provider if it chooses to accept
the promised opinion, or sends a “decline” message if it chooses not to continue the
transaction. The cost of each transaction is a non-negotiable amount. Upon receipt
of payment, the provider is not required to send its actual opinion, neither is the
provider forced to send any opinion at all.
Upon paying providers, but before receiving opinions from providers, the re-
questing appraiser is required to submit to the simulation engine its roster of opin-
ion providers and a set of corresponding weights. Weights are values between zero
and one, loosely representing the appraiser’s confidence or trust in each provider’s
opinion. The final appraisal requested is calculated by the simulation engine as
a weighted average of eligible opinions, using the weights communicated by the
agent to weigh each opinion. At the end of the transaction, the true value of the
painting is revealed to the agent by the simulation engine. Having learned the final
appraisal and the painting’s true value, the agent may use feedback to revise its
trust model of other appraisers.
In addition to conducting opinion transactions, appraisers can exchange repu-
tations, or information about the trustworthiness of other appraisers. The protocol
follows the same payment procedure set for the opinion transaction. Although a
reputation value has the same form as the weights mentioned before, appraisers
are not required to report to requesting appraisers the same weights submitted to
the simulation. Although these weights represent the providing appraiser’s subjec-
tive trust measures, a requesting appraiser can learn how to interpret the provider’s
weights after observing the relationships among several weights sent by the same
provider over time.
Each appraiser has a bank account, monitored by the simulator, from which
it pays transaction costs and into which are deposited client appraisal fees. The
winning appraiser agent is selected as the appraiser with the highest bank account
balance at the end.
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Since, in the Agent ART testbed, asking for reputation information has a cost,
we believe that using the social structure to select only agents that are more likely to
provide meaningful information could translate to a cost saving. In our model, once
the information is gathered, the opinion from the witness agent selected is weighed
taking into account the social relationships linking the agent with the witnesses and
the target agent.
2.5 Trust in Coalition Formation
Many tasks cannot be completed by a single agent, often because of limited re-
sources or capabilities of the agents. Sometimes even if a task could be completed
by a single agent, the performance of the single agent might be not acceptable.
In such situations, agents may form groups to solve the problem by cooperating.
Many organizational paradigms have been distinguished in the context of MAS
(see [39]). One of these paradigms is coalition formation.
Coalition formation is a fundamental form of interaction that allows the cre-
ation of coherent groups of autonomous agents in order to efficiently achieve their
individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is a major research chal-
lenge in the field of multi-agent systems. Central to this endeavour is the problem
of determining which of the possible coalitions to form in order to achieve some
goal.
The main issues in coalition formations are
• Coalition structure generation;
• Teamwork;
• Dividing the benefits of cooperation.
It is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate on these issues (for more infor-
mation see [64]).
As mentioned in the previous subsection, in open distributed systems, there are
many components that can enter and leave the system as they wish. Therefore,
the notion of trust becomes key when it comes to decisions about which coalitions
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to form, and when. When such systems are inhabited by agents that encompass
some degree of autonomy, each representing their own stakeholders with their own
objectives, it not only becomes plausible that some agents are not trustable, the
consequences of joining a coalition of which some members cannot be trusted, or
do not trust each other, becomes a key aspect in the decision of whether or not to
join a group of agents.
In the next subsection we present a survey of the state of art regarding coalition
formation models that consider trust as a factor.
2.5.1 Related Work in Trust in Coalition Formation
Cooperation inherently involves a certain degree of risk, arising from the uncer-
tainty associated with interacting with self-interested agents. Trust has been recog-
nised as a critical factor in assessing how likely it is for an agent to fulfill his
commitments [45, 20]. Normally, agents infer trust values based on experience
regarding previous interactions.
Our primary aim in the second part of this work is to consider trust in the
context of coalition formation. To date, there are very few coalition formation
models that consider trust as a factor. Core [56] is a trust model that tries to solve
the agent coalition formation problem. The model characterizes an agent’s trust
from two aspects: competence and reputation. Competence is used to establish
the extent to which an agent is fit for a particular job. Agents possess a series of
competences, which in Core are expressed as a vector space. To carry out each task
requires certain competences, and these requirements are also expressed as a vector
space. Euclidean distance is used to find the best fitting agent for a particular task
according to his competences. The appropriate agents for forming a coalition are
then selected according to their competence fitness and their trust values.
In [38], the concept of a clan is introduced. A clan is a group of agents who
trust each other and have similar objectives. In [38], coalitions are assumed to have
a long-term life, although often still directed towards a particular goal. Therefore
task-based approaches typically result in cooperation for a single goal, requiring a
team to be created for subsequent goals even if the team members are the same.
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Clans are considered to have a “medium-term” life and motivation is used as a
factor in the decision making process of whether to form a clan or accept the request
of joining a clan.
In both models, the coalition or clan formation process has to be initiated by an
individual agent. Therefore, the coalition formation process starts when an agent
i asks other agents he deems trustworthy to join its coalition. When asked to join
the coalition, an agent j can refuse the invitation if he does not trust i or he does not
have motivation to accept.
In these models, we believe one important element is neglected. The models
only consider the trust binding two agents i and j. Therefore if, for example a third
agent k is also asked to join the coalition, he will only check if his level of trust in
i, completely neglecting his opinion of j. We believe that this is an important issue
that could damage the stability of a coalition.
The approach proposed in this thesis tries to overcome this problem, providing
a rich and robust framework for agents to reason about the trust relationships among
them in the community. We also propose practical ways to allow the formation of
distrust-free coalitions.
2.5.2 Summary
In this chapter we have provided a classification of the various types of trust men-
tioned in the literature. We have provided an overview of the main computational
approaches to model trust and reputation.We also have reported problems that cur-
rent approaches have yet to tackle, which we try to address in this work.
Finally we have presented a survey of the state of art regarding coalition forma-
tion models which include trust as a factor.
Chapter 3
Building and Using Social
Structures
3.1 Motivation
One important question in trust and reputation research is what sources of informa-
tion agents can use to build their trust of others upon. As introduced in Section 2,
agent a can base its trust or reputation of agent b using experience of previous
interactions between them; or agent a might ask a third party c about its opinion
regarding b. An important additional source of trust is to use information about the
social relationship between agents [63]. We call the network of social relationships
social structure. If a and b are competing for the same resources, for example, this
may negatively affect the way they trust each other. Similarly, if agents a and b are
likely to have complementary resources, and their cooperation would benefit both,
it seems likely that they would be more inclined to trust each other.
Although models of social structure have begun to be considered in models of
trust and reputation [63], to date, implementing social structures, and hence prop-
erly evaluating their added value and validating them, has not been done. And,
most importantly, the issue of how a social structure evolves does not appear to
29
CHAPTER 3. BUILDING AND USING SOCIAL STRUCTURES 30
have been considered in the literature. These are the issues we address in this work.
We argue that agents who make decisions in scenarios where trust is important can
benefit from the use of a social structure, representing the social relationships that
exist between agents.
In this Chapter, we present a technique for agents to build a social network
representation of their local environment. We also show empirical evidence that
a trust model enhanced with a social structure representation which can be used
by the agent to gather additional information to select trustworthy agents for its
interactions, can improve the trust model’s performance.
In order to compare different models for trust in agent communities we used
the Agent ART testbed [34]. The Agent ART testbed is a platform for researchers
in trust to benchmark their specific trust models. More details regarding the Agent
ART testbed were given in section 2.4.
To illustrate our approach, we have taken two of the agents developed to com-
pete in previous Agent ART testbed competitions and enhanced them with a repre-
sentation of a social structure, and algorithms to build and refine this social struc-
ture. Then, we ran a number of competitions in which we evaluated and compared
the performance of our social agents. In particular, we measured the number of suc-
cessful interactions for each of them, the utility gained, and the number of rounds
won by them in a competition. When evaluated against all of those measures, the
social agents performed better than their asocial counterparts, which is encourag-
ing with regard to exploring social structures further, and to extend experiments to
other scenarios.
3.2 Social network analysis
Social network analysis is the study of social relationships between individuals in
a society, defined as a set of methods specifically developed to allow research and
analysis of the relational sides of these structures [35]. These social networks are
represented using graphs called sociograms. A different sociogram is normally
built for each type of social relationship to be examined, for example kinship or
friendship. According to the relationship considered, the graph can be directed or
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undirected, with or without weighted edges. However, for our purpose, we will
use a simplification of these multiple sociograms. In this work, we use a single
sociogram that we call a social structure. Using multiple sociograms allows the
agents to be linked to others in more than one social relationship at the same time.
Conversely, using a single sociogram allows the agents to be linked together in just
one social relationship at any given time. In Section 3.3.1, we explain in more detail
how the social structure is created and how the different types of social relationships
are taken into account.
In the multi-agent systems context, social structure analysis can play a vital
role. For example, the search for relevant information involves finding the right
sources – the agents who have the required information or expertise. Thus, social
network analysis can be an important tool in discovering these relevant information
sources. The interactions between individuals in the society can lead to the addition
of new links in the social structure.
Social network analysis has also been used in market trading context. In [23]
it has been considered how ’networks of influence’ between market traders impact
upon the agents’ performance.
Agents are aware of the presence of other agents in the society because of their
direct interactions, using services or asking opinions. However, interactions and
recommendations are also useful in predicting the relationships among agents. An
agent can infer from an indirect recommendation that a witness agent has used the
target agent, (i.e., the agent the recommendation is about), as a service provider.
This is because it is assumed that if two agents have interacted in the past, they will
have an opinion about each other.
It might be considered debatable, but in practice, we surely use this kind of “so-
cial logic” every day. Asking for a recommendation about a mechanic or restaurant
employs exactly this type of reasoning, taking into account the trust we have in the
person we are asking and his trust of the mechanic or restaurant [37].
Similarly, these trust relationships are used by computational agents to min-
imise the uncertainty the agents have while interacting. Although direct interac-
tions are perhaps the most reliable source of information to compute trust values,
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one cannot assume that each agent, at any stage, has interacted with every agent that
is relevant. Therefore, an agent might not be able to form an opinion, based just
on direct experiences, about every agent in the society. That is why “reputation”
information from third party agents, called witnesses, can complement information
gathered from direct interaction.
Although the aim of a recommendation from a third agent is to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the target, the agent that is asking the recommendation is also
able to draw a link, in its social structure, between the witness agent and the target
agent, thus building a more complete view of its environment. This simple intuition
is used in our approach to build the agent’s social structure.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the goal of partner selection in social networks
has been studied for a long time. In fact, Quattrociocchi et al [57] shown that
using different sources of information, when there is no correlations among the
different sources, contribute to uncertainty reduction in situations where trust is
required. This is exactly what we aim to show in our work, but we concentrate on
the specific contribution given by information from social relationships. Our tests
aim to show that a social structure as a source of information, together with the
common sources, can help agents in making more informed decisions in uncertain
situations.
In fact, the ultimate goal of our work is to allow agents to make better choices
of the partners to interact with.
3.3 Building the Social Structure
3.3.1 Identifying the Social Relationships
The concept of using a social structure to enhance a trust model was initially pro-
posed in a computational agent in the Regret model [63]. In Regret, an agent owns
a set of sociograms that show the social relations in the society. These sociograms
are not necessarily complete or accurate. However, Regret does not propose a way
for the agent to build sociograms.
The main contribution of this work is to show how the social structure can
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be built by each agent in the society and show, via evaluation, how using the social
structure in a trust model can improve the performance of the trust model. Using the
Agent ART testbed, we are able to use agents from past competitions and enhance
their internal trust models with the social structure. As the agents interact with
other agents they gather information about interactions and relationships in order
to build the network of agents and to better understand their social environment.
As in Regret [63], we consider three main types of social relationship
• Competition (COMP). This is the type of relation found between two agents
that pursue the same goals and need the same (usually scarce) resources.
This is the kind of relation that could appear between two sellers that sell the
same product or between two buyers that need the same product.
• Cooperation (COOP). This relation implies the exchange of sincere informa-
tion between the agents and some kind of predisposition to help each other if
possible. In other words, we assume that two agents cannot have at the same
time a competitive and a cooperative relation.
• Trade (TRD). This type of relation is compatible either with cooperative or
competitive relation. It reflects the existence of some commercial transac-
tions between two agents, without a distinctive competitive or collaborative
behaviour.
To identify the type of relationship between two agents in our Agent ART testbed,
we use the concept of expertise. The Agent ART testbed assigns to agents different
levels of expertise for each art era. The agents, during the game, can ask each
other information about their levels of expertise. The agents are providers of a
service which is the evaluation of a painting. However, they are, at the same time,
consumers of this service, when their level of expertise is not sufficient to evaluate
a particular painting. This means that agents with similar expertise compete in the
society for the same market share. Agents with different expertise are more likely
to cooperate because they will require each other’s services.
The Agent ART testbed scenario is designed so that agents are globally in
competition for client share, but able to cooperate on single appraisals. They are
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providers of a service, appraising a painting of a particular era, however they might
need to buy that same service from other agents who are more expert than them in
that era.
We now present a formal definition of the social structure.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph where V is a set of vertices of G and E ⊆ V×V the
set of edges of G. Formally, the social structure is defined as a undirected weighted
graph G = (V,E) where
• V is the finite set of vertices that represent the agents in the society,
• E ⊆ V×V , is the set of the edges that correspond to links between agents,
and
• each (a,b) ∈ E has associated with it a weight wab.
The weights associated on each edge will be used to identify the social relationship
between the two agents linked by that particular edge. To define this weight, we
introduce the concept of expertise distance. To compute how similar or different
the levels of expertise between two agents are, we use Euclidean distance. Each era
is considered as a dimension in an n-dimensional Euclidean Space, where n is the
number of eras. The total number of eras is defined in the games setting of Agent
ART testbed. The values of the different levels of expertise identify points in the
Euclidean Space. We can, therefore, define an agent x as a vector v = a1,a2, . . . ,an
where ai is the level of expertise for era i, i ∈ 1, . . . ,n and n, which is the total
number of different eras, is set in the game configuration settings.
The Euclidean distance d(a,b) between two n-dimensional vectors, or agents,
is given by:
d(a,b) =
√
(a1−b1)2+(a2−b2)2+ · · ·+(an−bn)2
This distance is called the expertise distance and it is the weight assigned to the
edge linking the agents a and b.
In the case where the agent does not have information about the expertise of
the other agent in a particular era, it is assumed the agents have the same expertise.
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If the agent assumes that the unknown value is at the low end of the range of
expertise’s value, this might artificially increase the distance measure. Setting it to
the same value will be equivalent to not considering that dimension in the distance
measure.
Agents who are a small distance apart have similar expertise and are considered
to be in a social relation of competition. The further apart the agents are in the
space, the more they depend and cooperate with each other, finding themselves in a
social cooperation relationship. When the distance between agents is neither small
nor large, we consider them to be in a trade relationship. This relationship does not
indicate an unclear situation in which the agent does not know what to do, but it
simply means that the two agents, according to their expertise, could occasionally
cooperate or compete. In the evaluation, we use a singleton value, as parameter of
the experiments, to assess the relationship, called expertise threshold.
3.3.2 Basic Concepts from Graph Theory
The Social Structure is represented as an undirected graph. Therefore, in this Sec-
tion we present some basic notions of Graph Theory used later on 1.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph, as introduced in the previous subsection. G is a
directed graph iff E is a set of directed edges (otherwise it is called undirected
graph). Note that it is equivalent to considering an undirected graph as defined by
a symmetric relation E on V×V .
A connected component of an undirected graph is a subgraph in which any two
vertices are connected to each other by paths, and to which no more vertices or
edges (from the larger graph) can be added while preserving its connectivity. This
is known as a maximal connected subgraph [69].
A dense graph is a graph in which the number of edges is close to the maximal
number of edges. The opposite, a graph with only a few edges, is a sparse graph.
Sometimes, a connected graph G can be so sparse that the removal of a single
vertex will disconnect it. Such vertices are quite important in our work. They
are called cutpoints. A vertex x is called a cutpoint in G if G \ {x} contains more
1For a more complete and detailed background on graph theory see [69]
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components than G does; in particular if G is connected, then a cutpoint is a vertex
x such that G\{x} is disconnected [69]. Figure 3.1 shows an example.
From a sociological point of view, a cut-point can be seen as indicating some
kind of local centrality (LC). In our context, it can be considered as the agent cen-
tralizing the largest amount of information among the agents in the components it
connects. A similar concept is expressed from the central points. There are vari-
ous measures of the centrality of a vertex within a graph that determine the relative
importance of a vertex within the graph. We use the degree centrality, defined as
the number of edges incident upon a vertex. Figure 3.2 shows an example. The
degree is often interpreted in terms of the immediate risk of a node being passed
through by whatever is flowing through the network, such as a virus, or in our case,
information.
3.3.3 Building and Maintaining the Social Structure
The steps that agents follow to build their social structure are as follows: initially,
the agent x starts with an empty social structure. Every time x directly interacts with
another agent y, asking for a painting appraisal, an edge is created between x and y.
Every time the agent x receives reputation information from a witness agent y about
a target agent z, an edge is created between y and z. This is because, as mentioned
before, it is assumed that an agent can infer from an indirect recommendation,
or reputation information, that the witness agent has used the target as a service
provider. The edges linking the agent that owns the social structure and other agents
are a result of direct interactions. The edges linking the other agents in the social
structure are the result of indirect interaction, or recommendation.
Algorithm 1 describes in pseudo code the procedure used to build the social
structure.
As explained earlier, the use of the social structure in the trust model is inspired
by Regret [63]. However the aim of our experiments is to analyse the impact of
the social structure on a general trust model. Therefore the trust model of the
agents selected is not changed to conform to the Regret trust model. Hence, the
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Algorithm 1: An algorithm for computing the Social Structure Soc for agent
x.
begin
Soc← /0;
while game is not over do
// if x asks y for a painting appraisal
if askedAppraisal(x,y) then
// an edge between x and y is added
if not already present
if (x,y) 6∈ Soc then
Soc← Soc+(x,y);
// the weight of the edge is updated
weight[(x,y)]← computeDistance(x,y);
// if x asks y for information about z
if askedRepInfo(x,y,z) then
// an edge between y and z is added if not
already present
if (y,z) 6∈ Soc then
Soc← Soc+(y,z);
// the weight of the edge is updated
weight[(y,z)]← computeDistance(y,z);
return Soc
end
task of dealing with potentially false information is left to the original trust model,
according to its own strategy.
The agent trust model is integrated with the use of the social structure as fol-
lows. We use the social structure to find witnesses to ask for reputation information
about other agents, to decide which witnesses will be consulted, and how to evalu-
ate those witnesses’ opinions.
The first step to calculate a witness reputation is to identify the set of witnesses
(W). The initial set of potential witnesses is the set of all agents that have interacted
with the target agent in the past. Starting from these agents, the social structure is
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filtered, leaving the portion that contains the selected agents. The result of this first
step is a subgraph of the initial social structure. This graph can be formed by more
than one connected component.
In a large society, the set of witnesses can be very big, and agents with frequent
interactions are likely to have a considerable amount of shared information that
tends to unify their way of thinking [53].
Algorithm 3 shows, in pseudo code, the steps required to compute the set of
witnesses for a particular target t.
The agents in the final set of witnesses, W, will be asked for reputation infor-
mation about the target agent.
According to Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the set W would be formed by agents e, x, y
and l. If W or the initial set are empty then the agent will behave in the same way
as without the use of the Social Structure. This situation can happen, for instance,
at the beginning of the game, where a sufficient number of interactions has not
taken place yet to allow the social structure to have meaningful information. The
social relationship linking the target agent and the witness agent affects the way the
reputation information is considered. For example, the agent is likely to discard
reputation information from witness agents who are in strong competition with the
target agent.
At every timestep, the social structure, and hence the weights on the edges,
are updated according to the new information received from the witness agents, as
illustrated in algorithm 1. This includes adding new links between the agents or
modifying the weights in relation to any expertise change, as shown in algorithm 2.
This helps the social structure to be dynamic and to reflect changes in behavior
from the agents in the society.
We have integrated this strategy in two agents that were previously developed
for the Agent ART Competition. From an initial examination of the implementa-
tion and documentation of the agents, we have observed that many of the agents
participating in the Agent ART Competition did not implement the reputation mod-
ule, available in the Agent ART testbed framework, in their trust model. They only
relied on direct interactions, because the total population in the competition was
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not large, allowing them to interact directly with almost every other agent. The
only agents implementing the reputation module were Simplet and Connected.
Simplet’s trust model is inspired by Liar [48], whose model was introduced in
Section 2.
Connected’s trust model creates and updates at every timestep a list of “friends”.
These friends are selected by calculating the accuracy of the previous paintings’
evaluations. Connected also has internal checks and different thresholds to decide
how accurate the evaluation is.
The next Chapter provides a description of the framework used for our test and
of the process used, together with an analysis of the results of our experiments.
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Algorithm 2: An algorithm for assigning weight on the edge between agents
x and y.
begin
foreach era ∈ Eras do
// Gather information about expertise of agent x
from the Agent ART testbed Simulation Engine
expertisex[era]← expertise(era,x);
// Gather information about expertise of agent y
from the Agent ART testbed Simulation Engine
expertisey[era]← expertise(era,y);
// if we do not know both values, we assume them
to be zero
/ if expertisex[era] and expertisey[era] is null then
expertisex[era]← 0;
expertisey[era]← 0;
else
// if we do not know one of the values for that
era, it is assumed the agents have the same
expertise
if expertisex[era] is null then
expertisex[era]← expertisey[era];
else if expertisey[era] is null then
expertisey[era]← expertisex[era];
// Compute the Euclidean Distance between the
two vectors of expertises
w← computeEuclideanDistance(expertisex,expertisey);
return w;
end
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Figure 3.1: Cutpoints: e, x and y
Figure 3.2: Central point: l
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Algorithm 3: An algorithm for computing the set of witnesses W, from the
Social Structure Soc, for target agent t.
begin
Ws← Soc;
// Remove from W vertices that are not linked to
t
remove−all(W, x, y) where x 6= t and y 6= t;
// Identify the connected components of W
Comp(Ws)← connectedComponents(Ws);
// For each component, finds cut-points or
central points
foreach Wi ∈ Comp(Ws) do if hasCutpoints(Wi) then
W←W + cutPoints(Wi)
else W←W + centralPoints(Wi) return W;
end
Chapter 4
Evaluation Methodology
One of the contributions of this work is to provide a systematic evaluation of the
use of the social structure, implemented as explained in the previous section, in a
trust model.
Therefore in this Chapter we provide a description of the framework used for
our tests and explain the process used for the evaluation, the parameters and the
metrics used. We also provide an analysis of the results.
4.1 Experiments and Analysis
Thirteen different configurations were developed. The parameters for each con-
figurations are shown in Table 4.1. The configurations contain parameters for the
simulation environment, the Agent ART testbed, and for the configuration of the
social structure in SocialSimplet and SocialConnected. The parameters of interest
for these tests are only a subset of those available for the simulation environment.
We provide now a description of the parameters tuned in our experiments:
• # Games: this parameter states how many runs are carried out for each con-
figuration;
• # Timesteps: this parameter states how many timesteps compose each game;
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• Certainty cost: this parameter specifies the fixed fee paid by opinion re-
questers to opinion providers for a certainty;
• Reputation Cost: this parameter specifies the fixed fee paid by reputation
requesters to reputation providers;
• # Era to change: this parameter states for how many eras the expertise value
will be changed at each timestep;
• Amount of expertise change: this parameter specifies the amount by which
each changing era will be modified;
• # Instance of each agent: this parameter specifies if more than one instance
of the same agent will be competing in the game;
• Initial reputation discard: this parameter is proper to the social structure
use. It decide whether the “social” agents will discard reputation information
provided at the very beginning of the game, when it is assumed that the
agents cannot have interacted with each other just yet.
• Expertise threshold: this value is used by the “social” agents when using
the social structure, to decide what social relationships links the two agents
examined in that particular instance.
For each configuration, 50 runs were carried out, as shown from the parameter
#games. All configurations have a constant set of agents consisting of those used
by the 2008 Agent ART Competition, (excluding Agent Uno [49]), plus SocialSim-
plet and SocialConnected. In this phase of our experiments, although the agents are
allowed to lie, we tried to reproduce a fair competition environment. Therefore, ex-
cluding Agent Uno was necessary because its trust model uses knowledge of the
design of the Agent ART testbed framework to tune the parameters of its trust
model. These parameters are available to programmers because they are described
in the documentation of the Agent ART testbed, however information regarding
these parameters is not available to the agents during the competition, unless the
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designer explicitly incorporated it during the coding phase. Therefore, in our opin-
ion, even if the parameters are available to designers, they should be deliberately
ignored for the sake of not biasing the trust model.
The configurations can be grouped into three subcategories. The first category
includes configurations A, B and C. This first group reflects the test setting used in
the official Agent ART Competition1. The aim of this first group of configurations
is to test the performance of the agents in settings with different dynamism.
Parameters such as #era to change and amount of expertise change are used to
create different levels of dynamism. As mentioned above, the era represents the
period of time a particular painting belongs to, and the expertise value represents
how confident the agent is about its knowledge in a particular era. Therefore, by
changing the level of expertise the agent has to react to variation in the other agents’
responses to an opinion request which might be due to different expertise rather
than strategy.
The second category includes configurations D, E, F, G, J. In this group we keep
the value of dynamism for the parameters #era to change and amount of expertise
change still to the intermediate value. The aim of this group of configurations is
to test, in particular, the “social” agents with respect to their performance in a set-
ting where the cost of communication among agents is removed. Since the agents
using the social structure make heavy use of reputation and expertise2 requests, it
is possible that their final performance is affected by these costs. In this group of
configurations, we also vary the total population, going from 1 instance of each
agent in the game to 10 instances for each agent. We also want to test if the social
structure proves to be more useful in a larger society and over a longer period of
time, therefore in configuration J, the number of timesteps is raised to 200.
The final category is comprised of configurations H, I, L, M and N. Again, in
this last group we consider the intermediate value of dynamism for the parameters
#era to change and amount of expertise change. We also keep the cost of the com-
1From the Agent ART Testbed Web site. http://megatron.iiia.csic.es/art-
testbed/competition2008.htm
2The expertise requests are called in the Agent ART Competition setting certainty request because
the agent can communicate its level of certainty about an opinion on a particular era
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munication among agents to zero. In this category, we test the performance of the
agent by varying parameters of the social structure (bottom Section of Table 4.1),
such as the expertise threshold used to identify the social relationship between two
agents in the social structure. This set of configurations also helps to fine tune
performance linked to these parameters in the Agent ART testbed.
The dark gray shaded cells in Table 4.1 identify the important parameters whose
values were changed for the given group of configurations.
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Several metrics are used to evaluate performance. Each metric is observed for
Simplet and Connected and their counterparts using the social structure, which
we call SocialSimplet and SocialConnected. The values are used to evaluate and
compare the performance of the agent with its social copy using the social structure.
The metrics considered are:
• the total utility, which is the bank balance at the end of the competition, as in
the Agent ART Competition;
• the number of games won, grouped by configuration setting; and
• the number of fulfilled and violated interactions, compared with the total
number of interactions.
Every interaction is intended as an exchange of information between agents.
This information can be an opinion about a painting or reputation information about
another agent. These two types of information can be considered as the two ser-
vices provided by the agents in the environment. This final metric is particularly
important in assessing the value of the social structure because it reveals how many
times the trust model has been successful in selecting a trustworthy agent. To as-
sess whether an interaction has been fulfilled or violated, the internal trust model
of each agent is analysed. In both Simplet and Connected, the agents use the dif-
ference between the true value of the painting and the opinion provided by other
agents in previous interactions. The true value of each painting is revealed after
every interaction, allowing the agent to calculate this value. The difference in the
values, together with the expertise of the agent providing the opinion in the con-
sidered painting’s era, allows the agent to decide if the interaction was fulfilled or
violated. This evaluation method depends on the agent internal trust model. There-
fore if the difference is above a certain threshold, the interaction is considered vio-
lated. Again, this threshold may be different in Simplet and Connected because it
is set in the internal trust model of each agent. The purpose of these experiments
is not to compare the trust model of Simplet vs Connected, but to compare each
of these agents with their social counterpart. Thus this threshold is not considered
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as a parameter of the experiments. Since each agent and its social copy have the
same trust model, this threshold will have the same value in both agents, meaning
the comparison is not affected by this.
4.2 Results
In Simplet, in Figure 4.1 we can observe the percentage of fulfilled interaction av-
eraged over the fifty runs for each configuration. Although our calculations show
that, overall, there is an improvement of only 3.64%, the total number of interac-
tions is considerably larger in SocialSimplet, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Fulfilled Interaction for all configurations for Simplet
and SocialSimplet.
The results show that SocialSimplet has, on average, 8200 more interactions
than Simplet. Thus the effective number of fulfilled interactions is substantially
larger. This improvement in the number of fulfilled interactions clearly shows that
the internal trust model of the agent benefits from the information derived from the
social structure. This suggests that the trust model with the social structure can
more accurately assess which agent is more likely to be trustworthy.
Since the social structure is updated after every time step, SocialSimplet is only
marginally affected by the change of dynamism in the configurations A, B and C,
going from a 72.6% of fulfilled interactions in configuration A, to a 70.5% in con-
figuration C. Simplet seems to suffer slightly more because of this change, losing a
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of Fulfilled Interaction for all configurations for Connected
and SocialConnected.
Figure 4.3: Percentage of Total Interaction for all configurations for Simplet and
SocialSimplet.
little more than 5% over the three sets of games. A similar trend may be observed
in Connected. Figure 4.2 shows an improvement of nearly 2%. Although this value
is smaller than the percentage reached in Simplet’s case, in this case there is a very
large increase in the number of interactions by SocialConnected, with respect to the
number of interactions in Connected, as shown in Figure 4.4, with over 350,000
more interactions, on average, over all configurations. We have analysed the rea-
son for this behaviour. We observed that the trust model of Connected comprises a
series of constrains used to select to interact with. Therefore, it happens, at times,
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of Total Interaction for all configurations for Connected and
SocialConnected
that the agent using Connected model ends up not asking for much information,
because no agents satisfy its complex constraints. However, in SocialConnected,
where the social structure is used for selecting the more trustworthy agents, most of
the time, the agent manages to select a set of agents to interact with. This results in
more interactions. In conclusion, the difference in the number of fulfilled interac-
tion for SocialConnected is, on average, more than 2 million in each configuration.
Also, SocialConnected is only marginally affected by the change of dynamism in
the configurations A, B and C, going from a 53% of fulfilled interactions in config-
uration A, to 51.66% in configuration C.
Figure 4.5: Percentage of Games Won for all configurations for Simplet and So-
cialSimplet.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of Games Won for all configurations for Connected and
SocialConnected.
Configurations F and G and J show to be amongst the highest percentage of
fulfilled interactions among the other configurations, in both SocialSimplet and So-
cialConnected. This means that the social structure is particularly useful in those
societies with a large number of agents, where direct interactions are not always
possible with every agent in the society. In configuration J, SocialSimplet nearly
achieves a total of the 80% of fulfilled interactions against a total of more than 130
thousand interactions, hence having more than 102,600 successful interactions.
SocialConnected reaches 65%, having more than 1 million successful interactions.
This shows that the accuracy of the social structure improves over time, because
after every interaction the social structure gains more information about the soci-
ety. Therefore in very long games, such as the runs in configuration J, the agent
can refine the social structure and obtain a better perception of the environment it
inhabits.
In configuration H, we consider that, at the beginning of the game, agents can-
not yet have meaningful information about the other agents in the society. There-
fore we do not add links between agents in the social structure when we receive
reputation information at the beginning of the game, if the agent thinks they are
initial default values. In Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, we can observe that ignoring
this initial information does not seem to adversely affect the performance of Social-
Simplet nor SocialConnected. This is because, since the social structure is updated
at every time step, the agent can correct any wrong assumption. From the set of
games in configurations I, L, M and N, we can learn that a good expertise threshold
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value seems to be one in the range 10.081 to 15.081. The expertise threshold is
used to assess the types of social relationships linking the agents. We can also note
that in configurations D, E, F and G, where the reputation and expertise requests
have no cost, there is a progressive improvement in the utility gained, in line with
the increasing total population, in both SocialSimplet and SocialConnected.
Figure 4.7: Percentage of Total Utility for all configurations for Simplet and So-
cialSimplet.
Figure 4.8: Percentage of Total Utility for all configurations for Connected and
SocialConnected.
On the other hand, when considering total utility, SocialSimplet performs bet-
ter over all the different configurations, but only by a small margin. Figure 4.5
and Figure 4.7 show, respectively, the percentage of games in which SocialSimplet
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wins, and the margin by which it wins. This shows that SocialSimplet wins very
often (almost 100% of the games), but by a small margin. This is due to the client
allocation share strategy, which is affected by the accuracy of the final appraisals
produced. The agent chooses a total amount, representing the time taken to exam-
ine the painting, to be spent in generating its own opinion about a painting’s value.
This amount affects the accuracy of the generated final appraisal; this parameter is
a strategic decision on how the agent manages its money, and it is not affected by
the changes made in SocialSimplet. In other words, the way Simplet administers
its money is not part of the trust model, even if it is affected by it to an extent. More
details about this issue are presented in Section 4.3. The margin of improvement in
the accuracy of the appraisals produced is due to the improved selections of other
agents who are asked for their opinions, but it is harder to appraise given that the
total utility is determined largely by the client allocation share strategy, which is the
same for Simplet and SocialSimplet in this evaluation. Considering that the only
difference in the two models, Simplet and SocialSimplet, is the use of the social
structure, it seems reasonable to infer that any improvement in the performance is
due to the social structure.
In Connected and SocialConnected we see similar behaviour. The difference in
the total utility gained, between the two agents, is more evident, both in the case
where Connected earns more and vice versa. We can observe, in Figure 4.8, that
SocialConnected, gains much more utility when the costs linked to the formation
of the social structure are removed, as shown in configuration D to N. This means
that the agent has more money available to invest in the generation of a more accu-
rate appraisal, hence affecting the client allocation share strategy and giving Social
Connected the possibility, in the next time step, to improve its performance.
4.3 Remarks on the Agent ART Testbed
The results presented in the previous Section demonstrate that the use of a social
structure can offer some benefits. However some remarks concerning the Agent
ART testbed are necessary to put these benefits in their proper context.
During each run in the competition, the agent has a set of clients, and each
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client will pay a fixed amount to obtain an appraisal for one painting. Each paint-
ing is classified in one of the finite set of eras. For a given era, the expertise of an
agent is modeled by an error distribution. To be more precise, an agent’s appraisal
is generated by the simulator, from a normal distribution whose mean is the paint-
ing’s true value and whose deviation is determined by the agent’s expertise and the
money it spends.3 Therefore, given that the expertise of the agent is predetermined
by the simulator, an agent can only directly affect the accuracy of its appraisals by
changing the amount of money it spends to generate the appraisals.
Although the client pays a fixed amount for the appraisals, the client’s share
allocation strategy depends on the accuracy of such appraisals. This means that
low accuracy appraisals can affect the number of clients the agent gets and so,
indirectly, its total utility.
Also as the agent has no way to control how many clients it can interact with it
can’t directly ”work harder” to improve its total performance.
Tuning these parameters correctly, we believe, is out of the scope of this work
and also out of scope for a trust model. This is the reason why we felt it necessary
to introduce, as measure of a successful trust model, the metric regarding fulfilled
and violated interactions. This also explains why the success of the “social” agents
are not proportionally reflected in the total utility.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we have outlined a way to combine concepts of social networking
and trust relationships. For the first time, this work has presented empirical ev-
idence that a technique to build and maintain a social network representation of
the environment allows a trust model to be more effective in selecting trustwor-
thy agents. Agents use their social network to obtain knowledge that they could
not gather otherwise, and use this knowledge to filter their trust relationships. Al-
though the idea of a social structure has already been presented previously [63],
there was no indication of how each agent would build this social network repre-
sentation. The only attempt made is in [6]. However, to the best of our knowledge
3For more details, see [34]
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the proposed model has never been implemented or validated.
We have presented a method for agents to build a social network representation
of their local environment. Using interaction information such as reputation infor-
mation, agents can maintain their own representation of such environments. With
this extended perception of the environments, agents can make more informed de-
cisions. Results show, on average, an improvement of nearly 3% in the quality of
their interactions, over a total of more than a million interactions. With this ap-
proach, we strive towards building an archetypal model for trust by combining the
concepts of social networking and trust and reputation relationships.
Although the proposed method for identifying social relationships is specific to
the particular scenario used for the evaluation, we should consider the general idea
behind this. In a general market-like scenario, sellers who sell the same products, or
provide the same kind of service, compete for the same market share, therefore they
can be considered in competition, as well as agents needing a particular product or
service, to operate in the market, need the “cooperation” of those agents selling that
particular product or providing that service.
Our quantitative results and conclusions are based on simple observations: in
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 for instance, the results for the social agent clearly domi-
nate those for the non-social agent under each scenario. For the other figures, more
subtle conclusions were drawn. But in all, our results set the scene for a more sys-
tematic analysis using an in-depth statistical toolbox on the results for the various
scenarios, and it indicates which parameters are interesting to analyse further.
We see this work as being influenced by but also contributing to further devel-
opment of a theoretical framework for social structures in multi-agent systems. We
have indicated in Section 3.1 how models of social structure are beginning to be
considered in the MAS community, and our work gives some hints as to how they
can be implemented and validated.
Chapter 5
An Abstract Framework for
Trust in Coalition Formation
5.1 Motivation
The goal of coalition formation is typically to form robust, cohesive groups that can
cooperate to the mutual benefit of all the coalition members. In open distributed
systems, where there are many components that can enter and leave the system
as they wish, the notion of trust becomes key when it comes to decisions about
which coalitions to form, and when. When such systems are inhabited by agents
that encompass some level of autonomy, each representing their own stakeholders
with their own objectives, it not only becomes plausible that some agents are not
trustable, but the consequences of joining a coalition of which some members can-
not be trusted, or do not trust each other, become a key aspect in the decision of
whether or not to join a group of agents.
With a relatively small number of exceptions mentioned in Chapter 2, existing
models of coalition formation do not generally consider trust [17, 41]. In more gen-
eral models [56, 38], individual agents use information about reputation and trust
to rank agents according to their level of trustworthiness. Therefore, if an agent
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decides to form a coalition, it can select those agents it reckons to be trustworthy.
These models are inherently local: they lack a global view. They only consider
the trust binding the agent starting the coalition and the agents receiving the re-
quest to join the coalition. In this chapter, we address this restriction. We propose
an abstract framework through which autonomous, self-interested agents can form
coalitions based on information relating to trust. In fact, we use distrust as the key
social concept in our work. Luckily, in many societies, trust is usually regarded
as the norm and distrust as the exception, so it seems reasonable to assume that
a system is provided with information of agents that distrust each other based on
previous experiences, rather than on reports of trust. Moreover, in several circum-
stances, it makes sense to assume that agents base their decision on which coalition
to form on explicit information of distrust, rather than on information about trust.
So, we focus on how distrust can be used as a mechanism for modelling and rea-
soning about the reliability of others, and, more importantly, about how to form
coalitions that satisfy some stability criteria. We present several notions of mutu-
ally trusting coalitions and define different measures to aggregate the information
presented in our distrust model.
Taking distrust as the basic entity in our model allows us to benefit in the sense
of deriving our core definitions from an analogy with a popular and highly influ-
ential approach within argumentation theory [58]. Specifically, the distrust-based
models that we introduce are inspired by the abstract argumentation frameworks
proposed by Dung [26]. Other studies have used argumentation to reason about
trust [62, 52], however our approach is different. These works are concerned with
computing arguments with trust or look to construct arguments about the trust that
one agent has in another. Our model does not use argumentation to reason about
trust and does not use trust to build arguments; it uses Dung’s abstract representa-
tion and interprets the relationships as distrust relationships.
In Dung’s framework, an attack relation between arguments is the basic notion,
which inspired us to model a distrust relation between agents. We show that several
notions of stability and of extensions in the theory of Dung naturally carry over to
a system where distrust, rather than attack, is at the core. We extend and refine
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some of these notions to our trust setting. In what follows, for each definition we
provide, we will relate, if appropriate, to the notions of Dung’s theory.
5.2 A Framework For Trust . . . Based On Distrust
In this Section, we introduce the basic models that we use throughout the remainder
of this chapter. Our approach is inspired by the abstract argumentation frameworks
of Dung [26]. Essentially, Dung was interested in trying to provide a framework
that would make it possible to make sense of a domain of discourse on which there
were potentially conflicting views. He considered the various conflicting views to
be represented in arguments, with an attack relation between arguments defining
which arguments were considered to be inconsistent with each other. This attack
relation is used to determine which sets of arguments are acceptable in some spec-
ified way. Evaluating conflicting arguments gives rise to ”extensions” that denote
minimally/maximally consistent sets of belief. These sets relate to the notion of
conflict-freeness or compatibility between the arguments in each set. Notice that
Dung’s framework focuses on capturing the notion of two arguments being incom-
patible, or inconsistent with one-another, rather than supporting each other. In our
work, we use similar graph like models, but our model is made up of agents, rather
than arguments, and the binary relation (which is used in determining which coali-
tions are acceptable), is a distrust relation.
A distrust relation between agent i and agent j is intended as agent i having
none or little trust in agent j. More precisely, when saying that agent i distrusts
agent j we mean that, in the context at hand, agent i has insufficient confidence in
agent j to share membership with j in a coalition.
When the agents share their evaluation about others, we can build a distrust
network of agents linked by distrust relationships. Previous work about networks
of agents use trust relationships [2]. However these networks can be transformed
into distrust-based networks. Trust values are usually binary or they fall in a fixed
range. When trust can assume values from a fixed range, one way to infer distrust
relationships starting from trust relationships is to set a threshold below which the
trust value is considered too low to trust the agent it is referring to.
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The follow definitions characterize our formal model.
Definition 1. An Abstract Trust Framework (ATF), S, is a pair:
S = 〈Ag,;〉
where:
• Ag is a finite, non-empty set of agents; and
• ; ⊆ Ag×Ag is a binary distrust relation on Ag.
When i; j we say that agent i distrusts agent j. We assume ; to be irreflexive,
i.e., no agent i distrusts itself. Whenever i does not distrust j, we write i 6; j. So,
we assume ∀i ∈ Ag, i 6; i. We call an agent i fully trustworthy if for all j ∈ Ag, we
have j 6; i. Also, i is trustworthy if for some j 6= i, j 6; i holds. Conversely, call i
fully trusting if for no j, i; j. And i is trusting if for some j 6= i, i 6; j 1 .
The assumption according to which an agent never distrusts itself might seem
too strong in a coalition formation context. Coalitions are usually created to allow
the member to achieve a goal that could not be achieved by each agent singu-
larly. Achieving this goal might require carrying out tasks that a single agent is not
equipped for. Therefore, it is possible that an agent could not trust itself to carry
out a particular task. However, at this stage, we are abstracting from the particular
task or goal that the coalition is trying to achieve. Hence, we are not taking into
account any skills that agents must possess to achieve the goal.
Later, we will find it convenient to compare abstract trust frameworks, and for
this we use the following definition.
Definition 2. If S1 = 〈Ag1,;1〉 and S2 = 〈Ag2,;2〉 are two ATFs, we say that S2
extends S1, written S1 v S2, if both Ag1 ⊆ Ag2 and;1 ⊆;2.
Let us consider an example.
1This assumption differentiates our model from Dung’s who allowed for self attacking arguments.
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Example 1. Consider the ATFs in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. In our
representation, the vertices represent agents and the arrows between them repre-
sent the distrust relation: if a; b, we represent this by an arrow from a to b.
Now:
• In the ATFs S1 and S2, distrust takes the pattern of a cycle. In particular, all
agents are trustworthy (but no agent is fully trustworthy) and all agents are
trusting (but none is fully trusting).
• In S3, agent a is not trusting and is not trustworthy.
• ATF S4 represents a situation where agents may be physically located lin-
early, and no agent trusts any of its neighbours.
• In S5, agents a and d are fully trustworthy and c and d are both fully trusting.
• The societies S6 and S8 are like S2, but now there is an additional agent d
who, in S8 is the only fully trustworthy agent, while in S6 he is the only fully
trusting agent.
• The society S7 is an extension of S6. In this society, no agent is fully trust-
worthy neither fully trusting. All agents distrust and are distrusted by other
agents.
5.2.1 Coalitions with Trust
In what follows, when we refer to a “coalition” it should be understood that we
mean nothing other than a subset C of Ag. When forming a coalition, there are
several ways to measure how much distrust there is among them, or how trustable
the coalition is with respect to the overall set of agents Ag.
Definition 3. Given an ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉, a coalition C ⊆ Ag is distrust-free if no
member of C distrusts any other member of C. Note that the empty coalition and
singleton coalitions {i} are distrust-free: we call them trivial coalitions.
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Figure 5.1: Three simple ATFs Figure 5.2: Three ATFs for four agents
Distrust freeness can be thought of as the most basic requirement for a trusted
coalition of agents. It means that a set of agents has no internal distrust relationships
between them. This idea is similar to Dung’s definition of conflict-free sets of
arguments.
Since we assume; to be irreflexive, we know that for any i ∈ Ag, the coalition
{i} is distrust-free, as is the empty coalition. A distrust-free coalition for S5 in
Figure 5.2 is, for example, {a,c,d}, and, while {b,c} is distrust-free in S3, society
S2 has no distrust-free coalitions other than the trivial ones.
Consider ATF S5 from Figure 5.2. The coalition C1 = {c,d} is distrust-free, but
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Figure 5.3: Two ATFs for four agents
still, they are not angelic: one of their members is being distrusted by some agent
in Ag, and they do not have any justification to ignore that. Compare this to the
coalition C2 = {a,c,d}: any accusations about the trustworthiness of c by b can be
neutralised by the fact that a does not trust b in the first place. So, as a collective,
they have a defense against possible distrust against them.
With this in mind, we define the following concepts.
Definition 4. Let ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 be given.
• An agent i ∈ Ag is called trustable with respect to a coalition C ⊆ Ag iff
∀y ∈ Ag((y; i)⇒∃x ∈ C(x; y)).
• A coalition C ⊆ Ag is a trusted extension of S iff C is distrust-free and every
agent i ∈ C is trustable with respect to C.
• A coalition C ⊆ Ag is a maximal trusted extension of S if C is a trusted
extension, and no superset of C is one.
Trusted extensions and maximal trusted extensions relate to the concept of ad-
missible and preferred extensions in Dung’s theory.
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Consider the two ATFs S1 and S2 of Figure 5.1, where distrust takes the form
of a cycle. In S2, the only coalitions C with respect to which a is trustable are
the coalitions that have b as a member: indeed, agent c distrusts a, but c in turn is
distrusted by b. However, there is no trusted extension of S2, which is easily seen
as follows. Suppose a would be in a trusted extension S. Since c distrusts a, there
needs to be an agent in S that distrusts c. The only agent that qualifies would be
b, but b and a cannot be at the same time in a distrust-free coalition. Similarly, the
only coalitions C with respect to which c is trustable are the coalitions that have a
as a member: indeed, agent b distrusts c, but b in turn is distrusted by a. Again,
suppose c would be in a trusted extension S. Since b distrusts c, there needs to be an
agent in S that distrusts b. The only agent that qualifies would be a, but c distrusts
a, therefore they cannot be at the same time in a distrust-free coalition. The same
process applies to agent b.
Contrast this to the society S1, where the distrust relation also forms a cycle,
but where the two extensions are {a,c} and {b,d}. It is easy to verify that those are
also maximal trusted extensions. So the two cycles S1 and S2 demonstrate that an
ATF can have several, or no maximal trusted extensions, respectively. Many studies
have been carried out regarding results concerning the extensions yielded by odd
and even length cycles in the abstract argumentation framework [55, 13]. Similar
results could be found in our work.
In S3 we have a society where agents have mutual distrust in each other. Here,
a is trustable with respect to every coalition C that includes a as a member. Agent
b is trustable with respect to {c} and with respect to {b} and all their supersets.
Here, the maximal trusted extensions are {a} and {b,c}.
Let us consider the societies of Figure 5.2. The maximal trusted extensions of
S4 are {a,c} and {b,d}. In general, if we have n agents lined up as in S4, the agents
a1 and an will be members of a maximal trusted extension, and such extensions
will consists of an agent and all its neighbours of neighbours, and their neighbours
of neighbours, etc. S5 has a unique maximal trusted extension, {a,c,d}.
Finally, note that we have S2 v S6 v S7. We have already seen that S2 has no
maximal extensions, and inspection shows that S6 has neither. However, S7 does
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have a maximal trusted extension: {a,d}. This shows that an extended society can
gain extensions, as soon as d starts to distrust c in S6, agents a and d together have
a good story why they would work together, and not with anybody else.
The concept of a trusted extension represents a basic and important notion for
agents who want to rationally decide who to form a coalition with, basing their
decisions on trust. In particular: a trusted extension is composed of agents that
have a rational basis to trust each other.
In Section 5.1, we underlined the fact that current coalition formation models
based on trust [56, 38], only consider the trust relationship between the agent who
asks another to join a coalition, and the agent asked. In our opinion, this approach
neglects to consider a more global view of the coalition. It is important to take into
account the trust relationships among all the agents in the coalition, to make sure
that everyone is satisfied. Consider the following example.
Figure 5.4: A more complex ATF
Example 2. Consider the ATF S9 in Figure 5.4. According to [56], the process of
forming a coalition should be initiated by a single agent, who will ask other agents
in the society whom he believes trustworthy to join him in a coalition. Consider
agent a as the agent initiating the coalition formation process. Let us assume a
is looking for at least three fellow agents to form a coalition with. According to
the ATF S9, a distrusts only c, therefore a can ask all the agents but c to form a
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coalition with it. Suppose a asks b and since b does not have a reason not to trust
a, it accepts the invitation. We now have a temporary coalition C1 formed by {a,b}.
The process continues and a decides to ask e to join it. Again, e has no reason to
distrust a so he accepts too. Our temporary coalition C1 is formed by {a,b,e}.
Continuing in this direction, a asks also d, who also has no reason not to trust a
so it accepts the invitation. When a has selected the number of agents it needs, the
process stops. Therefore the final coalition C1 is formed by {a,b,e,d}. All agents
in C1 are trusted by a and they all trust a.
In this example, it is easy to see that b is not trusted by d and both b and d
are not trusted by e. Therefore if, for example, the agent starting the process of
forming a coalition had been b, both e and d would have refused. Similarly, if e
had been asked by d to form a coalition with it, it would have refused. Nevertheless,
following this kind of approach, which uses trust as a factor in forming coalitions,
the result would be a coalition where at least three of its members, e, b, and d, do
not trust each other.
Coalition stability is a crucial problem. If agents do not trust the other compo-
nents of the coalition, they could break away from the alliance, playing a negative
role on the stability. Therefore, trust plays an important role for coalition stability.
Trusted extensions provide a simple method for the agents to find coalitions where
all the members are satisfied with their components.
5.2.2 Weak and Strong Trust
Maximal trusted extensions are a very interesting concept when considering the
formation of trusting coalitions. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, it is possible that
a particular ATF has more than one maximal trusted extension. One could assume
that all the agents in the maximal trusted extensions are equally trustworthy. For
example, with regard to ATF S4, in Figure 5.2 the maximal trusted extensions are
{a,c} and {b,d}. In this case, the agents appear respectively in only one maximal
trusted extension. Now consider the following ATF S10, as shown in Figure 5.5.
Here the maximal trusted extensions are {b,d,e} and {b, f ,c}. Suppose we are
trying to determine the status of two agents, b and c. One way to address this is to
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Figure 5.5: An ATF for weakly and strongly trusted agents
consider how many times b and c occur in a maximal trusted extension. We can see
that b occurs in both maximal trusted extensions, while c occurs in just one of them.
Therefore we can take this as evidence that b is somehow more “trustworthy” than
c.
With this in mind, we define the following concepts.
Definition 5. Let ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 be given.
• An agent i∈ Ag is Strongly Trusted if it is a member of every maximal trusted
extension.
• An agent i ∈ Ag is Weakly Trusted if it is a member of at least one maximal
trusted extension.
Therefore, returning to the ATF in Figure 5.5, agents c, d, e, f are weakly
trusted and agent b is strongly trusted (and hence also weakly trusted).
The notion of strongly and weakly trusted 2 can help agents decide in those
2The notion of strongly and weakly trust could be related to the Dung’s framework notion of credu-
lous and sceptical acceptance [28]
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situations where there are large maximal trusted extensions but not all the agents
are required for forming a stable coalition .
5.3 Personal Extensions
In large societies, it is very unlikely that a single agent manages to interact with
everyone in the society. For this reason, it has to rely on information given by
others, about the reputation of the agents it does not know. Reputation can be
defined as the opinion or view of someone about something [63]. This view can
be mainly derived from an aggregation of opinions of members of the community
about one of them. However, it is possible that the agent does not trust a particular
agent and it wants to discard its opinion. Therefore, when it comes to forming a
coalition, the agent wants to consider only its personal opinion and the opinion of
the agent it trusts, while still keeping the coalition distrust-free.
For example, suppose that an agent wants to start a project and it needs to form
a coalition to achieve its goals. It wants to form a coalition composed only of agents
it trusts and who have no distrust relations among them.
To capture this intuition, we introduce two notions of personal extensions,
which make it precise.
Maximal Personal Extensions: The first concept we define is the notion of the
Maximal Personal Extension.
Definition 6. Let the ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 and a ∈ Ag be given. Then C ⊆ Ag is
a Maximal Personal Extension generated by a, (notation: MPE(S,a)), if it is a
maximal trusted extension of the ATF S′ = 〈Ag′,;′〉, where:
• Ag′ = {x ∈ Ag | x 6; a}; and
• ;′= (Ag′×Ag′) ∩ ;.
That is, we remove all agents that distrust a from Ag, and restrict the distrust
relation to that set.
Consider the ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 in Figure 5.6. Suppose agent a wants to com-
pute its personal extensions. Then, according to our definition, agents x and c will
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Figure 5.6: S11, an ATF for Personal Extension
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be discarded because they distrust a. Therefore, the maximal trusted extensions
computed for this restricted set Ag′ are {a,d,g,h,y,u} and {a,d,g,h,y,v}. In gen-
eral, we can say that an agent b enters a maximal personal extension as long as
everybody that distrusts it is distrusted by someone which is accepted.
Unique Personal Extensions: Although the extensions obtained in this way are
maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion), this definition allows for more than one maximal
personal extension. Therefore, with regards to the example in Figure 5.6, agent
a will have to choose between two personal extensions. However, without other
information or additional criteria available to it, it would not be able to make a
justified decision. Therefore we introduce our second notion of personal extension,
the unique personal extension.
Given an ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉, and an agent a ∈ Ag, the unique personal extension
UPE(S,a) is required to have the following properties:
1. a ∈ UPE(S,a)
2. UPE(S,a) is unique
3. UPE(S,a) is distrust free
4. there is a minimal set OUT ⊆Ag, with the following properties, for all agents
x,y ∈ Ag:
(a) x; a⇒ x ∈ OUT
(b) (y ∈ UPE(S,a) & y; x)⇒ x ∈ OUT
(c) y ∈ UPE(S,a)⇔∀z(z; y⇒ z ∈ OUT)
So we make a coalition UPE(S,a) for a in such a way that there is a minimal
set OUT such that UPE(S,a)-members are only distrusted by OUT-members, and
only those that distrust a or that are distrusted by a member of UPE(S,a), are OUT .
Loosely put: we add a to UPE(S,a), and then we ensure that whoever distrusts or
is distrusted by somebody in UPE(S,a) is out, while UPE(S,a) only accepts those
agents as members that are at most distrusted by members of OUT .
CHAPTER 5. AN ATF FOR TRUST IN COALITION FORMATION 71
We define UPE(S,a) through an algorithm that generates it, from which the first
three properties can be directly derived (see Figure 5.7). The algorithm works as
follows. Given an ATF S= 〈Ag,;〉, we take an agent a∈ Ag, for whom we want to
compute the unique personal extension UPE(S,a), with the idea that this extension
is conceived as iteratively computing sets of agents IN (the agents accepted in the
process) using sets OUT (the agents that are rejected), CANDs (agents not in OUT)
and, finally, a set PROMOTE: those agents from CANDs that stand the test that they
are not distrusted by any agent in CANDs and go to IN. Note that the properties
IN ⊆ CANDs and CANDs = Ag \OUT are invariants of the algorithm: they are
both true at line 5, before entering the while-loop, and at line 10, at the end of the
loop.
Initially, nobody is IN (line 2 of Figure 5.7), but we put a, the agent whose per-
sonal extension we are computing, in PROMOTE (line 3), while the agents which
distrust a are definitely OUT . Then, as long as there are agents to be promoted,
do the following: mark the agents to be promoted as IN , (line 7), and make those
agents that are distrusted by any agent that is IN definitely OUT (line 8). Then re-
move the agents that are OUT from the set of CANDs (line 9) and PROMOTE those
agents that are candidates but not yet in if they are not distrusted by any candidate
in CANDs (line 10) 3.
Note that agents can be out for two reasons: first of all, they may distrust agent
a (line 4), or they may themselves be distrusted by an agent that is in (line 8).
Theorem 1. Let the ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 and a ∈ Ag be given.
If we define UPE(S,a) as the set IN returned by the function generate-UPE(S,a),
then UPE(S,a) satisfies the four requirements set out above.
Proof. Membership of a ∈ UPE(S,a) is because of lines 3 and 7, uniqueness is
because the algorithm is deterministic and it terminates. The latter holds since
every time PROMOTE 6= /0 at line 10, the set IN strictly increases at line 7, and this
can happen at most |Ag| times. UPE(S,a) is distrust-free because any candidate
3The algorithm introduced presents similarities with work carried out on labelling-based semantics
for Dung’s argumentation frameworks [68, 72]
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1. function generate-UPE(〈Ag,;〉,a) returns UPE(S,a)
2. IN := /0
3. PROMOTE := {a}
4. OUT := OUT ∪ {b ∈CANDs | b; a}
5. CANDs := Ag\ OUT
6. while PROMOTE 6= /0
7. IN := IN ∪ PROMOTE
8. OUT := OUT ∪ {b ∈ CANDs | ∃i ∈ IN i; b}
9. CANDs := CANDs \ OUT
10. PROMOTE := {c ∈ CANDs \ IN | ∀x ∈ CANDs x 6; c}
11. endwhile
12. return IN
13. end-function
Figure 5.7: An algorithm for generating UPE(S,a).
is definitely OUT if somebody in IN distrusts it (line 8). That there is a set OUT
with the properties of item 4 is immediate from the algorithm: (a) is ensured on
line 4, (b) on line 8, and (c) is true at line (5) and line (8). Since there are no other
assignments to OUT , this set is a minimal set with the properties (a) - (c).
The agents remaining in IN after this process form the agent a’s unique personal
extension: UPE(S,a).
Example 3. Consider again the example shown in Figure 5.6. With respect to this
example, we calculate UPE(S,a).
• Initially, IN is the empty set, PROMOTE becomes {a} and OUT becomes
{x}, since x distrusts a;
• We then enter the while loop, during which in the first cycle, agent a enters
IN, and OUT becomes {x,b}, since b is now distrusted by someone in IN.
Everybody outside OUT is in CANDs and now the agents to be promoted are
{d,g,h,y}: d and h are promoted since they are not distrusted by anybody,
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and g and y are promoted because the only agents that distrusted them (b
and x, respectively), are now out.
• In the next cycle of the while-loop, the variable IN becomes {a,d,g,h,y} and
OUT is {x,b,c,e} (the new members c and e are distrusted by the new IN-
members h and d, respectively. The set CANDs now becomes {a,d,g,h,y,u,v},
and PROMOTE is now empty and the program terminates with IN = {a,d,g,h,y}.
Note that the two agents u and v are candidates throughout the algorithm and
never become members of IN or OUT.
In general, we have that UPE(S,a) is included in every personal extension
generated by a set a. In fact, the two maximal personal extensions generated by a
in the ATF of Figure 5.6 are UPE(S,a)∪{u} and UPE(S,a)∪{v}. In UPE(S,a),
an agent b only enters if all agents distrusting b are already eliminated, while in
the maximal personal extensions generated by a, we may allow some other agents,
as long as everybody that distrusts them is distrusted by someone that is accepted.
This yields to bigger coalitions, but, as shown, the result is not unique.
All personal extensions, maximal and unique, are distrust-free. However, the
distrust relationship is not symmetric, i.e., if i distrusts j, it is not necessarily the
case that j distrusts i, and hence it can happen that one agent’s personal extension
is not trusted according with our definition 4. The agent preventing the extension
from being trusted will be the agent who the personal extension belongs to. With
respect to example in Figure 5.6, agent a is not trustable, as the agent distrusting
it, agent x is not distrusted itself by any of the agents in the personal extension.
However, for the purpose of the personal extension, this is not a problem because
it represents the coalition that agent a would choose for itself. Clearly agent a
considers itself trustworthy and agents who distrust it are not part of this coalition.
Another interesting property of the unique personal extension is illustrated by
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉, be given. Then
if (∃a ∈ Ag | ∀i ∈ Ag i 6; a) then
(∀j ∈ UPE(S,a),UPE(S, j) = UPE(S,a))
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Informally, Theorem 2 says that:
if the unique personal extension is computed by an agent who is distrust-
free in the whole society, therefore it is fully trustworthy, then all the
agents in that extension will have the same unique personal extension.
Proof. Consider, for example, agent h’s unique personal extension, from the ATF
S = 〈Ag,;〉 in Figure 5.6. Following the algorithm in Figure 5.7, agent h’s unique
personal extension will be formed by {d,h,x,b}. If the UPE is computed by an
agent who is distrust-free in the whole society, the unique personal extension is
equivalent to computing the grounded extension in Dung’s abstract argumentation
framework. Every abstract argumentation framework has a unique grounded exten-
sion. Therefore all the agent ∈ UPE(S,h) will have the same UPE. In fact, we can
notice that UPE(S,h) = UPE(S,x) = UPE(S,b) = UPE(S,d) = {d,h,x,b}.
It is important for the agent to know that, if it is not distrusted in the society,
then the agents in its unique personal extension will share its vision of personal
trustworthy coalition.
5.4 Aggregate Trust Measures
Abstract trust frameworks provide a social model of (dis)trust; they capture, at a
relatively high level of abstraction, who (dis)trusts who in a society, and notions
such as trusted extensions and personal extensions use these models to attempt to
understand which coalitions are free of negative social views. An obvious ques-
tion, however, is how the information presented in abstract trust frameworks can
be aggregated to provide a single measure of how trustworthy (or otherwise) an
individual within the society is. We now explore this issue. We present three ag-
gregate measures of trust, which are given relative to an abstract trust framework
S = 〈Ag,;〉 and an agent i ∈ Ag. All these trust values attempt to provide a prin-
cipled way of measuring the overall trustworthiness of agent i, taking into account
the information presented in S:
• Distrust Degree:
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This value ignores the structure of an ATF, and simply looks at how many or
how few agents in the society (dis)trust an agent.
• Expected trustworthiness:
This value is the ratio of the number of maximal trusted extensions of which
i is a member to the overall number of maximal trusted extensions in the
system S.
• Coalition expected trustworthiness:
This value attempts to measure the probability that an agent i ∈ Ag would
be trusted by an arbitrary coalition, picked from the overall set of possible
coalitions in the system.
These latter two values are related to solution concepts such as the Banzhaf index,
developed in the theory of cooperative games and voting power, and indeed they
are inspired by these measures [32].
5.4.1 Distrust Degree
On the web, several successful approaches to credibility such as PageRank [18, 51]
use methods derived from graph theory to model credibility, which utilize the con-
nections of the resource for evaluation. Several graph theoretic models of credibil-
ity and text retrieval [63] rely on the consideration of the in-degree of the vertex,
that is the sum of the incoming edges of that particular vertex in a directed graph.
The degree of the incoming edges is used to extract importance and trustworthiness.
In our model, incoming edges are distrust relationships, therefore they represent
a negative evaluation of a particular agent from the others in the society. Thus,
measuring the in-degree of an agent in the society can give an indication of how
reliable (or unreliable) that agent is considered overall.
Formally, we call this value the distrust-degree for an abstract trust framework
S = 〈Ag,;〉 and an agent i ∈ Ag, denoted as δi(S), and it is defined:
δi(S) =
|{x | x ∈ Ag and x; i}|
|Ag| .
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This number provides us with a measure of the reliability of the agent in the
whole society. The higher the number of agents that distrust it, the less reliable that
agent is considered to be.
However, as we mentioned before, a maximal trusted extension or, in general,
a coalition C, according to our approach, is a set of agents who trust each other.
Therefore, these agents may not be interested in the evaluation of agents outside
the coalition. They are more interested in a distrust degree relative to C. Hence,
we define the following measure. The coalition distrust-degree for an abstract trust
framework S = 〈Ag,;〉, a coalition C and an agent i ∈ Ag, denoted as δCi (S), is
defined as:
δCi (S) =
|{x | x ∈ C and x; i}|
|C| .
The coalition distrust degree provides a measure for the agents in C to select
agents outside the trusted coalition, who they believe to be more reliable among the
agents in the society. Agents in C can rank the agents outside using the value of
the coalition distrust degree. In this way, it is possible to obtain an ordered list of
the agents who the coalition consider less unreliable. The smaller the value of the
coalition distrust-degree, the more reliable the agent is considered.
5.4.2 Summary
So far, we have introduced four notions of extensions.
• Trusted Extensions The idea is to try and capture the concept of a group
of agents willing to work together or cooperate because there are no internal
conflicts among them;
• Maximal Trusted Extensions They are considered the largest trusted exten-
sions achievable in a society with certain distrust relationships;
• Maximal Personal Extensions They try to frame the idea of trusted exten-
sion from a single agent point of view;
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• Unique Personal Extensions They are derived from Personal Extensions
and allow the agent to make decisions when more than one Personal Exten-
sion can be formed.
5.4.3 Expected Trustworthiness
As we noted above, the expected trustworthiness of an agent i in system S is the
ratio of the number of maximal trusted extensions in S of which i is a member to
the overall number of maximal trusted extensions in the system S. To put it another
way, this value is the probability that agent i would appear in a maximal trusted
extension, if we picked such an extension uniformly at random from the set of all
maximal trusted extensions. Formally, letting mte(S) denote the set of maximal
trusted extensions in S = 〈Ag,;〉, the expected trustworthiness of agent i ∈ Ag is
denoted µi(S), defined as:
µi(S) =
|{C ∈ mte(S) | i ∈ C}|
|mte(S)| .
Clearly, if µi(S) = 1 then i is strongly trusted, according to the terminology
introduced above, and moreover i is weakly trusted iff µi(S)> 0.
From existing results in the argumentation literature on computing extensions
of abstract argument systems [29], we can also obtain the following:
Proposition 1. Given an ATF S = 〈Ag,;〉 and an agent i ∈ Ag:
1. It is #P-hard to compute µi(S).
2. It is NP-hard to check whether µi(S)> 0.
3. It is co-NP-hard to determine whether µi(S) = 0.
Proof. As mentioned in section 5.4, this measure is derived from the Banzhaf
power index [32]. The Banzhaf index is derived by simply counting, for each mem-
ber, the number of winning coalitions it can participate but which are not winning
if it does not participate. The complexity of calculating the Banzhaf index has been
proved in [46].
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i = a
C ⊆ Ag\{i} MPE in C∪{i} µi(C∪{i})
/0 {a} 1
{b} {a},{b} 0.5
{c} {a,c} 1
{d} {a,d} 1
{b,c} {a,c},{b} 0.5
{b,d} {a,d},{b} 0.5
{c,d} {a,c},{a,d} 1
{b,c,d} {a,c},{b,d} 0.5
i = b
/0 {b} 1
{a} {a},{b} 0.5
{c} {b},{c} 0.5
{d} {b,d} 1
{a,c} {a,c},{b} 0.5
{a,d} {a,d},{b} 0.5
{c,d} {b,d},{c} 0.5
{b,c,d} {a,c},{b,d} 0.5
Table 5.1: Table showing the values of µi to calculate the Coalition Expected Trust-
worthiness with regard to example S4 in Figure 5.2
For example, with respect to S4 in Figure 5.2, the maximal trusted extensions
are {a,c} and {b,d}, therefore the expected trustworthiness of all the agents in the
maximal trusted extensions is 0.5, since each of them is present in only one of the
two maximal trusted extensions.
However, in the example in S10 in Figure 5.5, the maximal trusted extensions
are {b,d,e} and {b, f ,c}. Therefore the expected trustworthiness of agent b is 1, as
it is a strongly trusted agent, while the expected trustworthiness of the other agents
d, e, f , and c is 0.5.
5.4.4 Coalition Expected Trustworthiness
There is one obvious problem with the overall expected trustworthiness value, as
we have introduced above. Suppose we have a society that is entirely trusting (i.e.,
the entire society is distrust free) apart from a single “rogue” agent, who distrusts
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everybody apart from himself, even though everybody trusts him. Then, according
to our current definitions, there is no maximal trusted extension apart from the
rogue agent. This is perhaps counter intuitive. To understand what the problem is,
observe that when deriving the value µi(S), we are taking into account the views of
all the agents in the society – which includes every rogue agent. It is this difficulty
that we attempt to overcome in the following measure. To define this value, we
need a little more notation. Where R⊆ X×X is a binary relation on some set X and
C ⊆ X, then we denote by restr(R,C) the relation obtained from R by restricting it
to C:
restr(R,C) = {(s,s′) ∈ R | {s,s′} ⊆ C}.
Then, where S= 〈Ag,;〉 is an abstract trust framework, and C⊆ Ag, we denote by
S ↓ C the abstract trust framework obtained by restricting the distrust relation; to
C:
S ↓ C = 〈C,restr(;,C)〉.
Given this, we can define the coalition expected trustworthiness, εi(S), of an agent
i in given an abstract trust framework S = 〈Ag,;〉 to be:
εi(S) =
1
2|Ag|−1 ∑C⊆Ag\{i}
µi(S ↓ C∪{i}).
Thus, εi(S) measures the expected value of µi for a coalition C∪{i} where C ⊆
Ag\{i} is picked uniformly at random from the set of all such possible coalitions.
There are 2|Ag|−1 coalitions not containing i, hence the first term in the definition.
Consider example S4 in Figure 5.2. In Table 5.1 we have shown a break down
of all elements necessary to compute the Coalition Expected Trustworthiness for
all the agents in S4. Note that the value of µa(S4) and µd(S4) will be the same and
the value of µb(S4) and µc(S4)will be the same as well. This is due to the particular
shape of S4. Therefore it is easy to notice that µa(S4) (and µd(S4)) is equal to 0.75,
while µb(S4) (and µc(S4)) is equal to 0.625.
We can observe that the values of the expected trustworthiness and the coali-
tion expected trustworthiness differ. The coalition expected trustworthiness value
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arguably gives us a clearer overall idea of what the trustworthiness of an agent
would be with respect to the maximal trusted extensions that can potentially be
formed, therefore it offers a better insight into trust issue related to the problem of
forming coalitions.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed some of the limitations of existing trust-based
coalition formation approaches. We have taken the notion of distrust to be our key
social concept.
The main contribution of this part of the work is the definition of an abstract
framework that overcomes the limitations mentioned in Section 5.1 allowing the
agents to form distrust-free coalitions. We have also formulated several notions of
mutually trusting coalitions. We have presented techniques for how the information
presented in our distrust model can be aggregated to produce individual measures
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the agent with respect to the whole society or to
a particular coalition.
The ATF model is not utility based, so we are not considering stability from a
utility-theoretic point of view, but there is nevertheless an interesting relationship
between our notion of stability and that of cooperative game theory. The best-
known notion of stability in cooperative game theory is the core: roughly, this
solution concept considers a coalition to be stable if no subset of the coalition has
any rational incentive to defect from the coalition, in the sense that they could earn
more for themselves by defecting. In our view, a coalition is stable if no agent has
any rational reason to distrust any of the members.
Overall, these notions and measures provide the agents with an effective tool
to assess the reliability of the agent as an individual in a society and as part of a
coalition.
Chapter 6
A Framework for Trust and
Distrust (ATDF): An extension
for ATF
6.1 Motivation
As explained in Chapter 5, agents in a society may not trust each other. These
conflicting relationships are captured in the ATF model by the distrust relationships
and are considered as a negative form of relationships. The concept of trustable
agent has been introduced to reinstate some of the distrusted agents, that is those
whose distrusters are in turn distrusted. This way, in a situation like i distrusts j and
j distrusts z, it could be implicitly assumed that i, distrusting the agent that distrusts
z is offering some kind of support, or indirect trust, to z, therefore this implicit
relationship can be considered a positive one.
In the basic ATF, only distrust relationships are explicitly represented by the
distrust relation, and positive relations are implicitly represented by the notion of
indirect support. Therefore, this kind of trust and distrust are dependent concepts.
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However, relations represented like this are not always a correct description of the
trust relationships in a realistic situation.
Many researchers have explored similar problems relatively to argumentation.
Some work is presented in [5]. However many argue that ”support” relationships
are not needed in an argumentation framework.
However, in our context, a situation where i trusts j and a situation where i nei-
ther trusts j nor distrusts j cannot be considered equivalent situations. The absence
of any kind of relation could simply mean that i has no opinion about j.
Hence, a richer framework is called for to formalize situations where two inde-
pendent kinds of relations are available.
The next Section gives the formal definition of the framework extended with
the explicit trust relationship.
6.2 A Framework for trust and distrust: A Formal
Definition
In this Section, we present an extension of the AFT described in Section 5. As men-
tioned in Section 6.1, in an AFT, the absence of a distrust relationship between two
agents does not necessarily imply the presence of a trust relationship. Therefore
it seems natural to complement the distrust framework just introduced with trust
relationships.
In this framework, as before, we make no assumptions about why agents share
their evaluations of the other agents in the community.
A trust relation between agent i and agent j formalises the idea of an agent i
having some trust in agent j. More precisely, when saying that agent i trusts agent j
we mean that, in this context, agent i believes to have sufficient confidence in agent
j to share membership with j in the same coalition. When the agents share their
evaluation about trust and distrust toward others, a social network of agents linked
by distrust and trust relationships can be built.
The following definitions characterize our formal model.
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Definition 7. An Abstract Trust/Distrust Framework (ATDF), S, is a triple:
S = 〈Ag,;,99K〉
where:
• Ag is a finite, non-empty set of agents; and
• ; ⊆ Ag×Ag is a binary distrust relation on Ag, as described in Section
5.2.
• 99K ⊆ Ag×Ag is a binary trust relation on Ag.
• ∀i, j ∈ Ag if i; j then i 699K j;
• ∀i ∈ Ag : i 99K i;
When i 99K j we say that agent i trusts agent j. We assume 99K to be always reflexive,
i.e., every agent always trusts himself. So, we assume, without drawing the link, that
∀i ∈ Ag, i 99K i. Whenever i does not trust j, we write i 699K j. Call an agent i fully
trusty if for all j ∈ Ag, we have j 99K i. Also, i is trusty if for some j 6= i, j 99K i
holds. Conversely, call i fully trustful if for all j, i 99K j. And i is trustful if for some
j 6= i, i 99K j.
Also in this extension, as well as in the ATF, the absence of trust relationships
between two agents i and j does not imply the presence of a distrust relationship.
Note that the fourth bullet of the definition states that an agent cannot trust and
distrust another agent at the same time. However we do not impose any of the
relationships to be mutual, therefore there is no restriction to prevent a situation
where for two agents i, j, i 99K j and j; i. We also allow situations where i 699K j
and i 6; j at the same time.
Example 4. Consider the ATFs in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. We omit reflective
trust link in figures. In our representation, the vertices stand for the agents and the
straight-lined arrows between them represent the distrust relation and the dotted-
lined arrows represent the trust relation. Now, in this ATDF, trust and distrust takes
the pattern of a cycle. In particular, in S12
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• agents a and c are fully trusting but not trusty;
• agent b is fully trustworthy and trusty;
• agent a is trustful;
• but no agents are fully trusty or fully trustful.
While in in S13:
• agents b and d are trusty, fully trustworthy and trusting;
• agents a and c are trustful, trustworthy and fully trusting;
Figure 6.1: S12, an example of ATDF for three agents
Figure 6.2: S13, an example of ATDF for four agents
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6.3 Coalitions based on Trust
6.3.1 Trust and Transitivity
The relationship between transitivity and trust represents an important element to
understand the intimate nature of the notion of trust. Since trust is considered the
glue of social interactions, investigating its complex nature can help to realize a
model to understand how it can be transferred to artificial societies [31].
Transitivity in trust is very often considered as a quite simple property, trivially
inferrable from the classical transitivity defined in mathematics, logic, or grammar.
The necessity of modelling trust in social networks is becoming more and more
important, therefore research around this topic has been focused on the goal of
inferring trust relationships between individuals that are not directly connected in
the networks.
The problem of trust transitivity can be expressed as follows: if i trusts j, and j
trusts z, what can be said about the trust relationship between i and z? Different and
occasionally contrasting answers were given to this problem. The question is not
only theoretically relevant; it is very relevant from a practical point of view [31].
If agents act in an open world, they will necessarily need to rely on third party
information when interacting with agents they have not met before.
Many authors [24, 4] have questioned whether the transitive property can be ap-
plied to trust. Many other authors [42, 37, 31] analysed the problem and developed
algorithms and solutions for inferring trust among agents not directly connected.
These approaches, often, differ from each other in the way they compute trust val-
ues and propagate those values among the agents.
We adopt the point of view mentioned in [37]. Trust is not perfectly transitive
in the mathematical sense, that is, if i highly trusts j, and j highly trusts z, it does
not exactly follow that i will highly trust z. There is, however, a notion that trust
can be passed between different individuals. When people ask a trusted friend for
an opinion about a mechanic, they are taking the friend’s opinion and use it to help
form a preliminary opinion of the mechanic [37]. We use this idea in the concept
of Trust Coalition, as explained in the next section.
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6.3.2 T-Coalitions (Trust-Coalitions)
In this work, trust transitivity is not explicitly used to create new trust relation-
ships among agents. However the notion of T-Coalition encompasses the idea of
considering the opinion of friends of the agent.
The idea of the ATDF is to allow agents, who share their trust and distrust re-
lationships, to form coalitions where all the members are satisfied with respect to
the trustworthiness of the agents. We have already seen, in Chapter 5, different no-
tions of mutually trusting coalitions, based on the principle of distrust freeness. As
explained previously, distrust freeness can be thought of as the most basic require-
ment for a trusted coalition of agents. It means that a set of agents has no internal
distrust relationships between them.
In this section, we provide a new definition of coalitions based on the trust rela-
tionships within the ATDF. Adding the trust relationships in our framework requires
the addition of another principle, which will take into account these explicitly de-
fined trust links between the agents.
The Trust-Coalitions (T-Coalitions) have to satisfy these two principles:
• Distrust-Freeness: A T-Coalition must be distrust-free with respect to the
distrust relationship in the ATF;
• Trust-supported: If two agents are in the same T-coalition, they must be di-
rectly or indirectly linked by a trust relationship.
These principles are consistent with the idea that a coalition is formed by agents
who do not have internal conflicts and recognise each other’s some merits, therefore
trust, in order to achieve a common goal or accomplish a task.
The Distrust-Freeness principle ensures that all the agents in the coalition have
no reason to distrust each other, while the Trust-Supported principle ensures that
all the agents are linked directly or indirectly by trust relationships.
We now present the formal definition of coalitions based on trust relationships.
Definition 8. Given an ATDF S= 〈Ag,;,99K〉, a coalition C⊆ Ag is a T-Coalition
(Trust-Coalition) if:
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1. C is distrust-free w.r.t. the; relationship;
2. ∀i and ∀j∈C,∃l1, l2, . . . ln ∈C | i 99K l1 (or l1 99K i), . . . , ln−1 99K ln (or ln 99K
ln−1), ln 99K j (or j 99K ln);
3. C is maximal w.r.t.⊆ among the sets satisfying 1 and 2.
The first requirement, (1), is in agreement with the distrust-freeness principle and
the second one, (2), ensures that the trust-supported principle is satisfied. The third
requirement, (3), simply ensures that the biggest coalition satisfying (1) and (2) is
created. This so formed T-coalition can be subsequently “filtered” to satisfy any
additional requirements, if needed.
Note that the singleton coalitions {i} can be T-Coalitions as there is always an
implicit trust relationship from and to the agent itself: we call them trivial T-
Coalitions.
Figure 6.3: An example of T-Coalitions for an ATDFs
In S14, shown in Figure 6.3, the T-Coalitions, apart from the trivial ones, are
{b,c,d} and {b,e, f ,g}.
We can see that b trusts a and c, and c trusts d. So, ideally b would be willing
to work with a in the same coalition. However, a distrust b and c distrust a, there-
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fore, adding a to the T-Coalition formed by {b,c,d} would go against the distrust-
freeness principle. The same can be said for the T-Coalition formed by {b,e, f ,g}.
If the distrust link between c and e was to be removed then the T-Coalition could be
much larger, allowing also c and d to be in it; creating, this way, only one big large
T-Coalition containing all the agents but a. The size of a coalition can be a very
important factor in certain contexts, nevertheless, preserving the distrust-freeness
is the most important requirement when considering coalition formation based on
trust.
6.4 Trust-induced Inference Rules
We have seen in the previous subsection that the transitive property of the trust
relationships is somehow encompassed by the use of the T-Coalitions which link
the agents together in a coalition if they are tied by trust relationships, even if not
directly.
Trust transitivity is normally used to infer an indirect trust relationship. For ex-
ample, if i trusts j and j trusts z than we could say, in some cases, that it is reasonable
to assume that i would trust z. The intuition is that, under normal circumstances,
we trust whoever our friends trust.
The same idea could be applied on a more general scale. As mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, in Section 6.3.1, if we are friends with someone, we tend
to trust his point of view towards his friends. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume
that we tend not to trust whoever our friends distrust.
Therefore, we present a rule to infer distrust relationships from trusted agents.
Definition 9. Given an ATDF S = 〈Ag,;,99K〉:
∀i, j,z ∈ Ag, if i 99K j and j; z and i 699K z then i; z;
Note that, as mentioned in Definition 7, an agent cannot trust and distrust another
agent at the same given time, and a direct relationships is considered “stronger”
than an inferred one. Therefore the distrust link is never inferred if there is already
a trust relationship linking the two agents involved in the inference process. For the
same reason, since it is implicitly assumed that an agent always trusts himself, the
distrust relationship is not inferred if it would create a self-distrust link, creating a
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situation like i; i.
The distrust relationship between the three agents is inferred only in the case
there is a trust relation linking the first two agents, that it the reason why we call it
trust-induced.
The inference process continues until there are no more distrust relations to be
inferred. Once the process has stopped, the maximal trusted extensions, personal
extensions and the aggregate measures can be re-computed.
Figure 6.4: An example for the application of the inference rule. Step 0
Figure 6.5: An example for the application of the inference rule. Step 1
Applying the trust-induced inference rule can add more information about the
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relationships among the agents and make the distrust relations clearly visible to the
whole society, which can benefit from this additional knowledge.
In Figure 6.4 we can see an ATDF of six agents. We will use this society to show
how the inference rule is applied. We call this Step 0, as it represents the initial
status of the society. The Maximal Trusted Extension for this ATDF is {a,b,d,e, f}.
Table 6.1 shows the aggregate measure values for each agent in the society for Step
0 and Step 3, the final one. In Figure 6.5, after applying the inference rule, we can
notice that a distrust edge has been added between a and c, inferred from the fact
that a trusts b and b distrusts c. Note that since d trusts c and c distrusts e, the
inference rule would generate the creation of a distrust link between agent d and
e. However d trusts e, therefore the inference rule is not applied in this case, as
specified in Definition 9.
Now that a new distrust connection appeared, the inference rule can be applied
again. Agent a now distrusts c, therefore, since agent f trusts a, a new distrust link
can be created between agent f and c, as shown in Figure 6.6. Iterating the process,
another distrust edge can be created between e and c. Note that, also in this case,
the distrust link between d and c is not created because there exists already a direct
trust relationships from d to c.
Notice that in the society at Step 3, the Maximal Trusted Extension remain
unchanged, but the values of the aggregate measure changes for agent c and e.
This suggests that these new distrust connections have provided the agents with
additional information about the society that they can use to make their decisions.
The next chapter will describe the application of the framework to a practical
scenario, and will show how the trusted extensions, the personal extensions and the
aggregate measures change with the application of the inference rule.
6.5 Trends in Maximal Trusted Extensions
The addition of new distrust connections in a society, intuitively, suggests that the
size of distrust-free groups of agents would possibly shrink but never increase. We
have seen that, in the case we applied the inference rule, the number of agents in
the society has not changed. Therefore, intuition tells us that, if we keep the size
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i Step 0 Step 3µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S)
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 1 1
c 0 0.5 0 0.1875
d 1 1 1 1
e 1 0.75 1 0.9375
f 1 1 1 1
Table 6.1: Table showing the values of µi to calculate the Coalition Expected Trust-
worthiness with regard to the example in Figure 6.4 for Step 0 and Figure 6.7 for
Step 3
of the society unchanged, increasing the number of distrust links could only create
more conflicts.
We are interested in verifying if it is possible to identify a trend in the way
the size of the Maximal Trusted Extensions evolves with the increase of distrust
relationships.
The intuition is that when the degree of “connectivity”1 is 0%, there are no
distrust relationships, therefore the Maximal Trusted Extension will be only one, of
the size of the society itself. Conversely, when the “connectivity” degree is 100%,
there are n× (n−1) distrust relationships, where n is the size of the society. In this
graph, each agent distrusts, and is distrusted by, all the other agents, therefore we
will have n Maximal Trusted Extensions of size 1, that is, every agent will be alone
in one MTE.
Given these two extremes, we are interested in checking if there exists any sort
of observable trend in between these two points.
It is easy to show that the trend in the changes of the average size of the MTEs
and the number of MTEs are not monotonic. We use the ATF in Figure 6.8 and
Figure 6.9 as an example to show that, effectively, the behaviour of the average
size of the MTEs and the number of MTEs are not monotonic.
1We call “connectivity” degree the sum of the indegree and outdegree of the verteces of the graph
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Step Mtes Number of Mtes Average Size of Mtes
1 {a,b,c} 1 3
2 {a,c} 1 2
3 {b,c} 1 2
4 {} 1 0
5 {c} 1 1
6 {b}, {c} 2 1
7 {a}, {b}, {c} 3 1
Table 6.2: Table showing changes in Mtes for ATF in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show what happens in the society as the distrust
relationships increase. Table 6.2 shows the MTEs, and their number and average
size at each step of the process of adding more distrust relationships.
We can notice that at step 1 with the connectivity equal to 0, we have only one
MTE formed by all the agents. At step 2, adding one distrust relationship causes the
MTE to shrink losing the one distrusted agent. At step 4, the distrust relationships
take the shape of a circle, causing the MTE to disappear completely. This is the
same scenario we have observed in the Figure 6.13 for series of societies of size 11
and 17. However, the addition of even one more distrust relationship can change
the situation. In Step 5 of Figure 6.9 adding just one distrust relationship allows the
formation of the MTE again. This time the size of the MTE has reached its minimum.
In fact, we can notice that in the next steps, the number of MTEs increases but the
average size remains unchanged.
We have carried out a number of experiments to verify if there is a trend,
although not monotonic, in the way the size of the Maximal Trusted Extensions
evolves with the increase of distrust relationships.
These tests do not consider the different topology configurations of the distrust
relationships that the ATF can assume. Testing what happens in all possible topol-
ogy configurations would be unfeasible. The number of topology configurations
corresponds to the powerset of the set of all possible edges in the graph represent-
ing the ATF. We mentioned already that the size of this set is n× (n−1), therefore
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the size of this powerset would be 2n×(n−1). The complexity of these tests is clearly
exponential.
Therefore the experiments we have carried out are not to be taken as a complete
analysis of the behaviour of the Maximal Trusted Extensions.
We have tested the behaviour of the MTE on a number of societies of different
sizes. We used different probability to increase the number of distrust links in the
society. We gradually increased the probability that two random agents in the so-
ciety are connected by a distrust relationship 2 from 0%, which gives a completely
disconnected graph, where no agent distrusts any other agent, to 100%, which gives
a completely connected graph, where all agents distrust each other.
We have measured what happens to the number of MTE and to the average size
of the MTE, in societies of size starting from just one agent up to 20. The probability
of connectivity is incremented 5% at each time step measured.
In Figure 6.10 the variation of the number of Maximal Trusted Extensions with
the increase of the probability of connectivity is represented. We can observe that
the chart does not show a smooth surface, which suggests that there is no monoton-
ically increasing trend in the behaviour of the MTE. To better illustrate the point,
we can observe Figure 6.11. This chart shows the behaviour of the MTEs for se-
lected society sizes. We can see that all the series show a fluctuating trend until
they stabilize to the maximum extreme.
Figure 6.12 shows how the average size of the Maximal Trusted Extensions
varies with the increase of the probability of connectivity. In this chart we can ob-
serve that the average size of the MTEs shows a more monotonically-like decreasing
behaviour.
Figure 6.13 shows selected series for certain society sizes, the same as in Fig-
ure 6.11. We can also observe that for the series of society size of 11 and 17 agents,
the series has value 0 when the probability of connectivity has, respectively, values
of 30% and 20%. This clearly means that the particular topology configuration of
the distrusts relationships that the ATF assumes in that timestep creates conflicts
such that no trusted extensions are possible.
2In what follows, we call this probability of connectivity
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In conclusion, we can say our experiments showed that while the number of
Maximal Trusted Extensions shows a high variation throughout the process of in-
creasing the probability of connectivity, the average size of Maximal Trusted Ex-
tensions follows a smoother decreasing trend, only occasionally interrupted.
This indicates that a society with a high degree of distrust has less probability
of being able to form a large trusted coalition.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an extension of the AFT described in Section 5.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, in the AFT, the absence of a distrust relationship be-
tween two agents does not necessarily imply the presence of a trust relationship.
Therefore it is natural to integrate trust relationships along with distrust relation-
ships in the ATF framework.
The contribution of this extension is to allow the agents to explicitly specify
which agent they trust and which one they distrust. The notion of T-Coalitions
allows the agents to form distrust-free coalitions with members who are linked by
trust relations.
Research on coalition stability is a crucial coalition problem. Stability is the
motivation of an agent’s refusal to break from the original coalition and form a new
one. There are two factors determining an agent’s trust in a coalition, one is that
the agent must possess necessary competence for a particular task, the other is that
all the agents involved in a coalition must behave honestly and diligently [56].
In this work, we have abstracted from the competence skills required to accom-
plish a particular task, but we concentrated on the belief that the agent needs to have
that its fellow coalition members will perform the task assigned without defecting.
Therefore, these coalitions can be considered stable in the sense that no agent
has any incentive to break from the coalition to join another one which it deems to
be more reliable.
Moreover, the trust-induced inference rule defined in Section 6.4 can be com-
pared to the use of reputation by agents when they do not have information from
direct interactions. In a large society it is not possible to interact with everyone
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and form an opinion about all the agents. Therefore agents often rely on third party
information about the agents they do not know personally. Applying the trust-
induced inference rule can not only add more information about the relationships
among the agents but can also make them clearly evident to the whole society, who
may benefit from this additional knowledge.
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Figure 6.6: An example for the application of the inference rule. Step 2
Figure 6.7: An example for the application of the inference rule. Step 3
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Figure 6.8: An example of changes in Maximal Trusted Extensions in a society of
three agents with increasing number of distrust relationships. Step 1 to 3
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Figure 6.9: An example of changes in Maximal Trusted Extensions in a society of
three agents with increasing number of distrust relationships. Step 4 to 7
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Figure 6.10: Chart showing how the number of Maximal Trusted Extensions
changes with the increase of Distrust Relationships, for different society sizes
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Figure 6.12: Chart showing how the average size of Maximal Trusted Extensions
changes with the increase of Distrust Relationships, for different society sizes
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Chapter 7
A Formal Analysis of Trust
and Distrust
Relationships in Shakespeare’s
Othello
In this chapter we use the famous tragedy by Shakespeare, Othello, to give an actual
illustration and analysis of the models proposed.
We have implemented the ATF framework and the functionality necessary to
extract the Maximal Trusted Extensions, Personal Extensions and compute all the
aggregate measures.
The play [1] revolves around four central characters: Othello, a Moorish gen-
eral in the Venetian army; his wife Desdemona; his lieutenant, Cassio; and his
trusted ensign Iago. Othello is a general in the Venetian Republic military, who is
in command of the army fighting the Turks attacking Cyprus.
The play opens with Roderigo, a rich and dissolute gentleman, complaining to
Iago, a highly-ranked soldier, that Iago has not told him about the secret marriage
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between Desdemona, the daughter of a Senator named Brabantio, and Othello.
Roderigo is upset by this development because he loves Desdemona and had pre-
viously asked her father for her hand in marriage. Iago is upset with Othello for
promoting Cassio, a younger man, above him, and tells Roderigo that he plans to
use Othello for his own advantage. Iago tries in many ways to have Cassio stripped
of his rank but he also wants to ruin Othello for having preferred Cassio over him.
Therefore Iago persuades Othello to be suspicious of Cassio and Desdemona. He
achieves this using a precious handkerchief that was Othello’s first gift to Desde-
mona and giving it to Cassio, with the help of his wife Emilia. The defense from
Iago towards Cassio, although not sincere, and his deliberate reticence are the cen-
tral part of Iago’s work of persuasion which leads to Othello killing Desdemona in a
fit of rage. In the epilogue, Emilia reveals that Desdemona’s betrayal was invented
by Iago, who immediately kills her. Othello, feeling guilty for killing the inno-
cent Desdemona, kills himself. Iago is arrested and Cassio takes Othello’s place as
general.
The play is divided in five acts. We take this division as the natural breaking
points for modelling the scenarios with our AFT and AFDT. We design an AFT and
AFDT for each act, using the main characters and the ; and 99K relationships,
representing the distrust (or more in general dislike) and trust relationships among
the characters.
For each of the main characters we give the aggregate trust measures for each
act and for Othello and Iago, the primary actors, we also present the UPE. Moreover
we analyse how the ATDF evolves with the application of the inference rule, and
show how these changes are reflected in the aggregate trust measures.
In our ATFs representing the play Othello, we only consider the main charac-
ters: Othello, Desdemona, Iago, Cassio, Roderigo and, for the first act, Brabantio.
Therefore our context is limited to the relationships among these figures.
Normally, in multi-agent systems scenarios, a coalition is a set of agents who
may or may not work together to achieve a common goal or to earn higher util-
ity [70]. In our example, the Othello play, we abstract from the goal of the coalition
and we consider the proposed trusted set of agents simply as sets whose compo-
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nents trust, or have no reason to distrust each other. In the next paragraphs we
provide a more extensive description of each act and then we provide a detailed
analysis of the society.
7.1 ACT 1 Synopsis
Shakespeare’s famous play of love turned bad by unfounded jealousy begins in
Venice with Iago, a soldier under Othello’s command arguing with Roderigo, a
wealthy Venetian. Roderigo has paid Iago a considerable sum of money to spy
on Othello for him, since he wishes to take Othello’s girlfriend, Desdemona as his
own.
Roderigo fears that Iago has not been telling him enough about Desdemona and
that this proves Iago’s real loyalty is to Othello rather than him. Iago explains his
hatred of Othello for choosing Cassio as his lieutenant and not him as he expected.
To regain Roderigo’s trust, Iago informs Brabantio, Desdemona’s father, of her
relationship with Othello the “Moor”, which enrages Brabantio into sending parties
out at night to apprehend Othello for what in Brabantio’s eyes must be an abuse of
his daughter by Othello. Iago lies that Roderigo, and not himself, was responsible
for angering Brabantio against Othello, Iago telling Othello that he should watch
out for Brabantio’s men who are looking for him. Othello decides not to hide, since
he believes his good name will stand him in good stead.
We learn that Othello has married Desdemona. Brabantio and Roderigo arrive,
Brabantio accusing Othello of using magic on his daughter. Othello stops a fight
before it can happen but he is called away to discuss a crisis in Cyprus, much to
the anger of Brabantio who wants justice for what he believes Othello has done to
his fair Desdemona. The Duke is in council with several senators discussing their
enemy, the Turks (Turkish people). Brabantio complains to the Duke that Othello
bewitched his daughter and had intimate relations with her. Desdemona is brought
in to settle the matter, Othello meanwhile explains how he and Desdemona fell in
love. Desdemona confirms this and the Duke advises Brabantio that he would be
better off accepting the marriage than complaining and changing nothing.
The Duke orders Othello to Cyprus to fight the Turks, with Desdemona to fol-
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low, accompanied by the trusted Iago. Roderigo despairs that his quest for Desde-
mona is over now that she is married, but Iago tells him not to give up and earn
money instead; soon Desdemona will bore of Othello.
Alone, Iago reveals his intention to continue using Roderigo for money and
his hatred of Othello (Othello picked Cassio and not Iago as his lieutenant). Iago
explains that his plan to get revenge on Othello is to suggest to him that Cassio is
sleeping with Desdemona.
7.2 ACT 1 Analysis
In Figure 7.1 and 7.2 we observe that the only distrust-free characters, at the end of
the first act, are Desdemona and Roderigo.
The maximal trusted extension is formed by
{Desdemona,Roderigo,Cassio,Brabantio}.
Note that Othello, although a noble person at the beginning of our story, is hated
and therefore distrusted by Iago, who feels betrayed by him, by Roderigo who feels
Desdemona has been stolen from him by Othello, and by Brabantio, Desdemona’s
father, who does not approve of the couple’s marriage.
Maximal Trusted Extensions T-Coalitions
Act 1 {Desdemona,Roderigo,Cassio, {Desdemona,Brabantion}
Brabantio} {Othello,Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 2 {Desdemona,Roderigo, Iago} {Roderigo, Iago}{Othello,Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 3 {Desdemona, Iago} {Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 4 {Desdemona, Iago} {Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 5 {Othello,Desdemona}{Desdemona,Roderigo} {Cassio,Desdemona}
Table 7.1: Table showing the Maximal Trusted Extensions and the T-Coalitions in
the Othello’s society S for each Act
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Figure 7.1: ATF for Act 1 Figure 7.2: ATDF for Act 1
Therefore Othello is highly distrusted in the first act, as shown by his coalition
expected trustworthiness value, 0.125, which is the lowest among all characters in
this act. However, his beloved Desdemona and his loyal lieutenant Cassio trust him
and, in fact they are part of Othello’s unique personal extension. Desdemona, being
distrust free is part of Iago’s unique personal extension, together with Brabantio,
who is also distrust free. The T-Coalitions in this first act are two:
{Desdemona, Brabantio} and {Othello, Desdemona, Cassio}.
Note that Othello’s unique personal extension corresponds exactly to the T-
Coalition he belongs to. Although Iago’s coalition expected trustworthiness value,
0.5, is higher than Othello’s, we note that Iago does not belong to any T-Coalition.
Although Othello trusts Iago, Iago himself despises Othello. This conflict prevents
them from being together in a T-Coalition.
In Table 7.4, Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 we can find the values for the respective
items for the society after applying the inference rule.
For the first act, it is not possible to infer any new distrust relationship. For
instance, Desdemona trusts her father Brabantio and Brabantio distrusts Othello.
The distrust relationship between Brabantio and Othello would cause Desdemona
to adopt her father’s point of view and distrust Othello, if we were to apply the
CHAPTER 7. A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST AND DISTRUST 108
Othello’s UPE Iago’s UPE
Act 1 {Othello,Desdemona,Cassio} {Iago,Desdemona,Brabantio}
Act 2 {Othello,Desdemona,Cassio} {Iago,Desdemona,Roderigo}
Act 3 {Othello} {Iago,Desdemona}
Act 4 {Othello} {Iago,Desdemona}
Act 5 {Othello,Desdemona} {Iago,Desdemona}
Table 7.2: Table showing the Unique Personal Extensions of Othello and Iago in
the society S for each Act
Act 1 Act 2 Act 3 Act 4 Act 5
µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S)
i = Othello 0.0 0.125 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.187
i = Iago 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.333 0.395
i = Cassio 1.0 0.75 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.25 0.333 0.458
i = Roderigo 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 na na na na 0.333 0.833
i = Desdemona 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.75 1.0 0.75 1.0 1.0
i = Brabantio 1.0 1.0 na na na na na na na na
Table 7.3: Table showing the values of µi, Expected Trustworthiness, and the εi(S),
Coalition Expected Trustworthiness, with regard to the Othello’s society S for each
Act
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Maximal Trusted Extensions T-Coalitions
Act 1 {Desdemona,Roderigo,Cassio, {Desdemona,Brabantion}
Brabantio} {Othello,Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 2
{Desdemona,Roderigo, Iago} {Roderigo, Iago}
{Othello,Desdemona}
{Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 3 {Desdemona, Iago} {Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 4 {Desdemona, Iago} {Desdemona,Cassio}
Act 5 {Othello,Desdemona}{Desdemona,Roderigo} {Cassio,Desdemona}
Table 7.4: Table showing the Maximal Trusted Extensions and the T-Coalitions in
the Othello’s society S for each Act after applying the Inference Rule
inference rule. However there is already a direct and mutual trust relationship be-
tween Desdemona and Othello. Therefore there is no change in the values of the
Maximal Trusted Relationships, Personal Extensions and aggregate measures for
the first act.
7.3 ACT 2 Synopsis
Several weeks later in Cyprus, Othello’s arrival is expected. But a terrible storm has
largely battered and destroyed the Turkish fleet, which no longer poses a threat to
Cyprus. Unfortunately there are fears that this same storm drowned Othello as well.
Many people praise Othello. Cassio, who has arrived, sings Desdemona’s praises.
A ship is spotted but it is Desdemona and Iago’s, not Othello’s. Iago suspects that
Cassio loves Desdemona and slyly uses it to his advantage. Iago tells Roderigo that
he still has a chance with Desdemona but Cassio whom Desdemona could love is
in the way. Killing Cassio (who became Othello’s lieutenant instead of Iago) will
leave Desdemona to Roderigo, Iago slyly explains.
Othello finally arrives, to everyone’s great relief. Iago decides to tell Othello
that Cassio is having an affair with Desdemona, so Iago will be rewarded whilst
Cassio will be punished. A Herald announces celebration that “our noble general
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Othello’s UPE Iago’s UPE
Act 1 {Othello,Desdemona,Cassio} {Iago,Desdemona,Brabantio}
Act 2 {Othello,Desdemona} {Iago,Desdemona,Roderigo}
Act 3 {Othello} {Iago,Desdemona}
Act 4 {Othello} {Iago,Desdemona}
Act 5 {Othello,Desdemona} {Iago}
Table 7.5: Table showing the Unique Personal Extensions of Othello and Iago in
the Othello’s society S for each Act after applying the Inference Rule
Act 1 Act 2 Act 3 Act 4 Act 5
µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S) µi(S) εi(S)
i = Othello 0.0 0.125 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.218
i = Iago 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.333 0.156
i = Cassio 1.0 0.75 0.0 0.125 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.25 0.333 0.437
i = Roderigo 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 na na na na 0.333 0.833
i = Desdemona 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.75 1.0 0.75 1.0 1.0
i = Brabantio 1.0 1.0 na na na na na na na na
Table 7.6: Table showing the values of µi, Expected Trustworthiness, and the εi(S),
Coalition Expected Trustworthiness, with regard to the Othello’s society S for each
Act after applying the Inference Rule
Othello!” has defeated the Turkish fleet, calling on all to celebrate this great tri-
umph and also to celebrate Othello’s “nuptial” or wedding to the fair Desdemona.
Iago learns more of Cassio’s high regard for Desdemona and Iago manipulates
Cassio into drinking too much since he is certain Cassio will do something he will
regret. Iago also tells Roderigo to attack Cassio. This happens, and Cassio wounds
Roderigo. Othello is now awake and Cassio’s name ruined. Othello, although he
loves Cassio, has no choice but to demote him from his position as his lieutenant.
Next Iago comforts Cassio by suggesting he speak with Desdemona who could
put in a good word for him with Othello. Iago comforts a wounded Roderigo,
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telling him he has won by ruining Cassio’s name. Iago has his wife Emilia ensure
Desdemona and Cassio will talk so Othello can see his wife talking with Cassio,
allowing Iago to convince Othello that Desdemona is being unfaithful.
7.4 ACT 2 Analysis
In the second act, as shown in Figure 7.3 and 7.4, the distrust and trust relationships
between the characters change. Our models reflect these changes.
Figure 7.3: ATF for Act 2 Figure 7.4: ATDF for Act 2
We can observe that now Iago has become distrust free, since Roderigo has
regained trust in him. Roderigo now distrusts Cassio, as well as Othello, convinced
by Iago that he should attack Cassio to ruin Othello’s name.
The Maximal trusted extension now includes Iago and excludes Cassio. It is, in
fact formed by
{Desdemona, Roderigo, Iago}.
This newly acquired distrust-freeness, boosts Iago’s coalition expected trustwor-
thiness to 1, while Cassio’s decreases to 0.25, since Othello has lost trust in him
because of his fight with Roderigo.
Iago’s unique personal extension now includes Roderigo, having the distrust
relationship from Roderigo to Iago being removed.
Othello’s coalition expected trustworthiness improves slightly, being 0.25 in
this act. This is due to the absence of Brabantio in this act. His unique personal
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extension does not vary. It still includes Cassio because, even though Othello has
lost trust in him, due to his fight, Iago has still not convinced Othello of Cassio’s
betrayal.
The T-Coalitions now include the one formed by {Roderigo, Iago} which re-
flect the actual cooperation between the two in this second act, even if Iago’s mo-
tives are not genuine.
Figure 7.5: ATF for Act 2 after apply-
ing the inference rule
Figure 7.6: ATDF for Act 2 after applying
the inference rule
As shown in Figure 7.6, in this act, we can infer a new distrust relationship
from Othello versus Cassio, caused by the fact that Othello is trusting Iago and
is falling for Iago’s lies regarding Cassio. We can also notice that in this act the
trust relationship from Othello to Cassio has disappeared due to the incident that
has seen Cassio wounding Roderigo. The absence of this trust relation allows now
Othello to have doubt regarding Cassio and therefore trusting Iago’s words. This
is also reflected in Othello’s unique personal extensions which now contains only
Desdemona.
We can also notice a change in the T-Coalition. Othello and Cassio, clearly,
are not in the same T-Coalition anymore. Hence, Desdemona, who trusts both, is
in two different T-Coalitions, one with Othello and one with Cassio. The events
in this act also cause Cassio’s Coalition Expected Trustworthiness to decrease to
0.125.
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7.5 ACT 3 Synopsis
Cassio tells Iago that he has arranged to meet Desdemona, Iago helping Cassio to
do this. Iago’s wife, Emilia, tells Cassio that Othello would like to reinstate him
as his lieutenant but the fact that Cassio’s fight is public news prevents Othello
from doing this immediately. Emilia tells Cassio that she can arrange a meeting
with Desdemona. Some time later, Cassio speaks with a very sympathetic Des-
demona who assures him that Othello still very much loves Cassio. Furthermore,
Desdemona promises to keep putting in a good word for Cassio until he is again
Othello’s lieutenant. At a distance, Iago manipulates Othello by first suggesting
shock and then hiding his outbursts from Othello. This guarantees Othello’s atten-
tion, as Iago plants seeds of doubt in Othello’s mind about Desdemona’s fidelity
especially where Cassio is concerned. Iago leaves Othello almost convinced that
his wife is having an affair with Cassio.
Othello now complains of a headache to Desdemona, which results in her drop-
ping a strawberry patterned handkerchief, Othello’s first gift to her. Emilia picks
this up and gives it to Iago who decides the handkerchief could help his manip-
ulation if he ensures Cassio receives it. Iago arranges to place the handkerchief
near Cassio’s lodgings or home where he is certain to find it and take it as his own,
unaware that it is Othello’s gift to Desdemona.
A furious Othello returns to Iago, certain his wife is faithful and demanding
proof from Iago of Desdemona’s infidelity. Reluctantly and hesitantly, Iago tells
Othello he saw Cassio wipe his brow with Desdemona’s handkerchief. Othello is
convinced, cursing his wife and telling Iago who is now promoted to lieutenant to
kill Cassio. Othello will deal with Desdemona. Desdemona worries about her miss-
ing handkerchief and comments that if she lost it, it could lead Othello doubting
her fidelity. Emilia, when asked about Desdemona’s lost handkerchief, lies, deny-
ing having seen the handkerchief she picked up and gave to Iago. Othello enters;
asking Desdemona for the very same handkerchief and Desdemona assures him
that the handkerchief is not lost and will be found. Desdemona now tries to change
the subject to Cassio, but Othello continually stresses the value the handkerchief
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has to him, this leading to Othello angrily ordering his wife away.
Cassio arrives, Desdemona telling him that her attempts to help him are not
going well. Iago claims total ignorance to the cause of Othello’s fury. Cassio gives
Othello’s handkerchief, which he found, to his suspicious mistress Bianca.
7.6 ACT 4 Synopsis
Iago fans the flames of Othello’s distrust and fury with Desdemona’s supposed
“infidelity” by first suggesting Desdemona shared her bed with Cassio, and then
that Desdemona’s gesture of giving away the handkerchief is no big deal. But Iago
knows exactly how hurtful to Othello this is, giving away this sentimental gift.
Next, Iago suggests to Othello that Cassio will “blab” or gloat to others about
his conquest of Desdemona and then tells Othello that Cassio boasted to him that
he did indeed sleep with Desdemona. Meeting later with Cassio, Iago cunningly
talks to Cassio about Cassio’s mistress Bianca, each smile and each gesture made
by Cassio infuriating a hidden Othello who thinks Cassio is talking about sleeping
with Desdemona. Next Bianca arrives, angrily giving back the handkerchief Cassio
gave to her. This infuriates Othello since as Iago puts it, Cassio not only received
Othello’s handkerchief from his wife but then gave it away to Bianca as if it were
worthless. Othello decides to kill Desdemona by strangulation in her bed, Iago’s
idea. Iago pledges to kill Cassio.
Lodovico (Desdemona’s cousin) arrives, announcing that Othello is to return
home and Cassio is to be the next Governor of Cyprus. Desdemona’s joy for Cassio
enrages Othello, leaving Lodovico and Iago to wonder how much Othello seems
to have changed and leaving poor Desdemona to wonder how she offended the
man she truly loves. Othello questions Emilia as to whether Desdemona was un-
faithful to him. Annoyed that Emilia’s answers suggest nothing has happened be-
tween Desdemona and Cassio, Othello dismisses her comments as those of a simple
woman. Othello meets Desdemona, Desdemona becoming increasingly upset with
her husband’s anger towards her, an anger she cannot understand. Othello eventu-
ally reveals to Desdemona that her infidelity is the source of his anger, Desdemona
pleading her innocence on deaf ears. Emilia and Desdemona discuss Othello’s
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strange behavior. Emilia is certain some evil fellow has twisted Othello to believe
Desdemona has been unfaithful, not realizing that this evil man is her own husband
Iago.
We learn that Iago has been pocketing Roderigo’s gifts to Desdemona, which
never reached her. Fearing Roderigo will learn this, Iago tells Roderigo that Cas-
sio must die since Iago benefits if either man dies. Lodovico tries to calm Othello
down. Othello orders Desdemona to bed to await him later, an order Desdemona
dutifully obeys out of love for Othello. Emilia notices that Othello is much calmer
now and tells Desdemona her bed has been made with her wedding sheets as re-
quested. Desdemona asks to be buried in those same sheets should she die before
Emilia, a hint of trouble ahead.
Emilia is forbidden from joining Desdemona in her bedchamber, angering her.
Desdemona, depressed, recalls a song (The Willow Song) of a maid who was sim-
ilarly abused by her husband and sings it. Desdemona talks to Emilia from behind
the door about infidelity. Desdemona claims she would not be unfaithful to her
husband for all the world while the more cynical and worldly Emilia admits she
would, for the right price.
7.7 ACT 3 and 4 Analysis
In the third act, Othello is convinced that Desdemona and Cassio are having an
affair, therefore he distrusts them both. Hence, in our model two new distrust
relationships appear.
Desdemona, although she is now distrusted by Othello, remains in the maximal
trusted extension, indirectly defended by Iago’s distrust toward Othello. Iago still
remains distrust-free in the society.
Cassio’s coalition expected trustworthiness decrease to 0.25, while Iago’s reaches
1. This reflects the actual situation in the play. Iago is considered a very loyal
friend.
Othello is now alone. He does not trust Cassio or Desdemona anymore. This is
shown by the fact that his unique personal extension has only himself in it.
Note that now the only T-Coalition is formed by {Desdemona,Cassio} who,
CHAPTER 7. A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST AND DISTRUST 116
Figure 7.7: ATF for Act 3 and 4 Figure 7.8: ATDF for Act 3 and 4
being still unaware of Iago’s plot, keep trusting each other.
Again, in this act, no new distrust relationship can be inferred due to the struc-
ture of the trust relationships among the characters in the society.
For instance, Desdemona trusts Othello even if he doesn’t trust her anymore.
Othello now despises Cassio. This would cause Desdemona to distrust Cassio as
well. However she is trying to help Cassio to regain trust from Othello, there-
fore there is already a direct and mutual trust relationship between Desdemona and
Cassio. Since there is no additional distrust relationship there is no change in the
values of the Maximal Trusted Relationships, Personal Extensions and aggregate
measures for the this act.
In the fourth act, the trust and distrust relationships remain unchanged with
respect to the third act.
7.8 ACT 5 Synopsis
Iago and Roderigo wait in a street to ambush Cassio. Iago tells Roderigo how to
kill him. Iago does not care which ends up dead. Iago is worried about Roderigo’s
increasing questioning of what happened to jewels that were given to him to pass
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on to Desdemona. Roderigo attacks Cassio but Cassio wounds Roderigo instead.
Iago from behind stabs Cassio, wounding him in the leg. Othello hearing Cassio’s
cries is pleased, announcing that he too will soon kill (Desdemona). Lodovico and
Gratiano (Desdemona’s uncle) and Iago reappear, Iago claiming total innocence
to Cassio’s injuries even though he inflicted them. Seizing Roderigo, Iago stabs
and wounds him “in revenge” for wounding his “friend” Cassio. Gratiano and
Lodovico tend to Cassio’s wound. Bianca, Cassio’s mistress arrives, Iago cleverly
laying suspicion for Cassio’s injuries on his innocent mistress, shifting suspicions
from Iago.
Othello enters Desdemona’s bedchamber trying to convince himself that he is
killing her for her own good. He kisses his still asleep wife one last time. Desde-
mona awakens, but Othello will still kill her, telling her to pray so her soul will not
die when she does. Desdemona again asks what wrong she has committed, Othello
telling her that she gave Cassio his handkerchief, by which he means he thinks she
had an affair with him. Desdemona pleads her innocence, telling Othello to bring
Cassio over to prove she did not give away her handkerchief. Othello says he con-
fessed and is dead, Desdemona’s fear and surprise prompting Othello to believe she
does care for him.
Othello kills Desdemona.
Emilia, banging on the door outside, cannot stop this. Later Emilia is let in, re-
vealing Iago has killed Roderigo and Desdemona who was thought dead, murmurs
her last breaths but loyally does not say Othello killed her. Othello tells Emilia
he killed her and Emilia despite Iago’s attempts to remove her reveals the truth
about the handkerchief; she found it, and then gave it to Iago. Iago, now in trouble,
stabs his wife Emilia and escapes. Emilia dies, singing the “Willow Song” before
criticizing Othello for killing his loving wife.
Lodovico, Cassio and the now captured prisoner Iago soon appear, Othello stab-
bing Iago but not killing him before having his sword removed. Lodovico is disap-
pointed that Othello, a man so honorable has reverted to acting like a slave. Oth-
ello tries to argue that killing his wife was a noble action but it falls on deaf ears.
Lodovico learns that Othello and Iago plotted Cassio’s death. Lodovico reveals
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letters in the dead Roderigo’s pocket proving Cassio was to be killed by Roderigo.
Iago proudly confirms that Cassio did find the handkerchief in his bedchamber be-
cause Iago placed it there to be found. Othello, realizing what he has done, kills
himself with a concealed weapon and lies himself on top of his wife. Cassio is
placed in charge of Iago and Lodovico leaves to discuss this sad matter with others
abroad.
7.9 ACT 5 Analysis
In the end of the final act, the truth is finally revealed. Roderigo finally understands
that Iago has used him. Othello realises that he has been a fool and victim of Iago’s
plot. This is shown by the new distrust relationships from Roderigo and Othello to
Iago.
Desdemona is now dead and Cassio realises that Othello was planning to kill
him too. Cassio now distrusts Othello and Iago. On the other side, Othello now
trusts Cassio again, realizing that Cassio has always been loyal to him.
Figure 7.9: ATF for Act 5 Figure 7.10: ATDF for Act 5
The last act changes Iago’s situation drastically. His coalition expected trust-
worthiness drops from 1 to 0.3. His unique personal extension includes only Des-
demona who died before realising she was part of the Iago’s plot.
Othello’s situation remains bad. His coalition expected trustworthiness is very
low, 0.18. His unique personal extension includes Desdemona, who, even before
dying, refused to betray her beloved husband by revealing that he was her killer.
Othello’s renewed trust in Desdemona means that there is now another T-Coalition
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formed by the two, since Desdemona never stopped trusting Othello.
Figure 7.11: ATF for Act 5 after applying
the inference rule
Figure 7.12: ATDF for Act 5 after apply-
ing the inference rule
In this act, we can infer a new distrust relationship from Desdemona to Iago.
This means that Iago is now distrusted by everyone in the society. This is the first
time since the first act, where he was distrusted by Roderigo, that he does no longer
appear in the Maximal Trusted Extension. His coalition expected trustworthiness
drops even further from 0.3 to 0.15. His unique personal extension does not include
any other character in the society. Iago is now completely alone and distrusted.
7.10 Summary
In this chapter we have used the famous tragedy by Shakespeare, Othello, to give
an actual representation and analysis of the models proposed.
The implementation of the ATF framework and the functionality to compute the
Maximal Trusted Extensions, Personal Extensions and all the aggregate measures
helped extract the data for the illustrative tables.
The analysis of the Othello scenario has shown that the models can successfully
reproduce combinations of trust and distrust relationships for realistic situations.
The changes in the relationships are reflected in our models and so are the values
of the aggregate measures, working as a mirror of the society.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
8.1.1 Building and Using Social Structures
In the first part of this thesis we have described a method to allow agents to use
information about the society they live in to make decisions about trust.
We have seen that in trust and reputation research using multiple sources of
information is crucial to allow a robust trust model to function effectively. The
combination of various methods and sources of information, including those re-
lated to social relations, allows the agent to calculate trust and reputation values
at different stages of knowledge of the society. Some trust and reputation systems
[63] have recognized the value of using information about social relationships to
support trust decisions. However, we have explained that little work has been done
to properly evaluate and validate this added value. Moreover, the issue of how a
social structure, representing these social relations between agents in the society, is
created at the start, and how it evolves, does not appear to have been considered in
the literature.
Therefore, we have presented a technique for agents to build a social network
representation of their local environment. As the agents interact with other agents
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they gather information about interactions and relationships in order to build the
network of agents and to better understand their social environment. We have
shown that we are able to identify 3 types of social relationships:
• Competition (COMP). This is the type of relation found between two agents
that pursue the same goals and need the same (usually scarce) resources. This
kind of relation could appear between two sellers that sell the same product
or between two buyers that need the same product.
• Cooperation (COOP). This relation implies the exchange of sincere informa-
tion between the agents and some kind of predisposition to help each other if
possible. In other words, we assume that two agents cannot have at the same
time a competitive and a cooperative relation.
• Trade (TRD). This type of relation is compatible either with cooperative or
competitive relation. It reflects the existence of some commercial transac-
tions between two agents, without a distinctive competitive or collaborative
behaviour.
According to the type of relation linking two agents, they can make different deci-
sions when it comes to trust-related situations.
We have also shown empirical evidence that a trust model enhanced with a
social structure representation, used to gather additional information to select trust-
worthy agents for an agent’s interactions, can improve the trust model’s perfor-
mance.
8.1.2 A Framework for Trust and Distrust
In the second part of this thesis, we have introduced an abstract framework that
takes trust and distrust into account for coalition formation. Coalition formation,
the process by which a group of software agents come together and agree to coor-
dinate and cooperate in the performance of a set of tasks, is an important form of
interaction in multi-agent systems. Such coalitions can improve the performance
of the individual agents or the whole system, especially when tasks cannot be per-
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formed by a single agent, or when a group of agents would perform the tasks more
efficiently.
With a relatively small number of exceptions mentioned in Chapter 2, existing
models of coalition formation do not consider trust [17, 41] and in more general
models [56, 38], individual agents use information about reputation and trust to
rank agents according to their level of trustworthiness. We have explained that
these models lack a global view because they only consider the trust binding the
agent starting the coalition and the agents receiving the request to join the coalition.
We have addressed these limitations through the definition of an abstract frame-
work that allows agents to form distrust-free coalitions. We have formulated several
notions of mutually trusting coalitions. We have also presented techniques for how
the information presented in our distrust model can be aggregated to produce in-
dividual measures to evaluate the trustworthiness of the agent with respect to the
whole society or to a particular coalition. We also have presented a way to com-
bine the trust and distrust relationships to form coalitions which are still distrust-
free. Moreover, the analysis of the Othello’s scenario shown that the models can
successfully reproduce combinations of trust and distrust relationships for realistic
situations. The changes in the relationships are reflected in our models and so are
the values of the aggregate measures, working as a mirror of the society.
8.2 Future Work
We have divided the future work in two parts. The future work related with building
and using social structures in agent societies and the future work related with the
abstract framework for trust and distrust.
8.2.1 Building and Using Social Structures
Although our approach makes a number of advances to the state of the art, there
are still a number of ways in which this work can be further extended. Here we
propose a short list of topics we think would improve our approach:
• Our quantitative results and conclusions are based on observations. As in-
troduced in Section 4.4, for certain measures the results for the social agent
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simply dominate those for the non-social agent under each scenario. For the
other measures, more subtle conclusions were drawn. Therefore, our results
would benefit from a more systematic analysis using an in-depth statistical
toolbox on the results for the various scenarios, and investigating which pa-
rameters are interesting to analyse further.
• Having considered the remarks made on the Agent ART testbed, similar
testbed could be considered as an alternative, such as the ”Trading Agent
Competition” [3]. However these frameworks present similar issues as the
Agent ART testbed. In the Trading Agent Competition, agents will have to
demonstrate ability in dealing with decisions about variations in customer
demand and availability of supplies. Again, we feel that these factors could
contribute negatively to the agent performance with regard with trust. There-
fore, we feel that it would be more useful to set up a simpler testbed, where
the factors involved in the success of an interaction are only the ones related
with the trust decisions. Similar test sets have been used for the well-known
Prisoner’s Dilemma Competition by [8] and by the more recent [15]. Further-
more, additional testing of our approach would validate further the general
nature of the method.
• In the computation of the distance measure, one overall value for all the
different eras is calculated. Therefore it is difficult to separate particular
eras where expertises of the two agents diverge more than those where the
difference is minor. This could lead to the computation of a value that does
not represent accurately the level of conflict between the agents. Recent work
[63, 40] in trust and reputation models consider trust as a multi-facet concept,
hence in our scenario, different eras can be viewed as different perspectives.
• Moreover, in future works, it might be interesting to consider that, for a same
amount of difference in expertise, the behaviours (cooperative/competitive)
of the agents might differ according to their current goal, whether it is gather-
ing information, or providing it or selecting a partner for a certain interaction.
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• The way the social structure is updated every time new information is ac-
quired could be refined by using link prediction techniques [43] and path
analysis [50] and explore other measures of similarity.
• Finally, in our work we do not consider the possibility that the agents may lie
in the expertise value they provide to others. Therefore, it would be useful
to investigate measures to normalize the values received to account for the
possibility of agents lying.
8.2.2 A Framework for Trust and Distrust
Coalition stability is a crucial issue. Stability is the motivation of an agent’s refusal
to break from the original coalition and form a new one. We have presented several
notions of mutually trusting coalitions that we believe improve current coalition
formation techniques based on trust. However, there are aspects that need improve-
ment.
• We have at various times been talking about the notion of stability in coali-
tion formation. As mentioned in 4.4 there is the cooperative game theory
literature on stability in coalition formation – see [54] for details. The best-
known notion of stability in cooperative game theory is the core. This solu-
tion concept considers a coalition to be stable if no subset of the coalition has
any rational incentive to defect from the coalition, in the sense that they could
earn more for themselves by defecting. In our view, a coalition is stable if no
agent has any rational incentive to distrust any of the members. Future work
might consider examining the role of our distrust models in coalition forma-
tion in more detail, perhaps in the context of coalition formation algorithms
such as those recently proposed within the MAS community (see, e.g., [64]).
• There are two factors determining an agent’s trust in a coalition, one is that
the agent must possess necessary competence for a particular task, the other
is that all the agents involved in a coalition must behave honestly and dili-
gently [56]. In this work, we have abstracted from the competence skills
required to accomplish a particular task, but we concentrated on the belief
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that the agent needs to have that its fellow coalition members will perform
the task assigned without defecting. An intersting development would be the
ability to combine information about skills and competence together with
information about trust during the computation of the coalition. This will
allow for different perspectives to be analysed. By introducing this measure,
we aim to make the framework more general, in order for it to consider fea-
tures other than trust.
• Our work is based on a boolean notion of trust. However in real scenarios,
an agent has neither a complete trust or no trust at all in another agent. There
could be various degree of trust in between. For example, in the Othello sce-
nario, in Act 2, Othello’s trust in Cassio changes during the act. We have
represented this simply by removing the trust relationship between the two.
However, it’s clear for the story, that Othello feels sorry of having to demote
Cassio. Hence, he still has some degree of trust toward Cassio. Therefore
being able to add degrees of trust or distrust to our model would allow to
frame more specific situations and cater for more detailed information. Per-
haps, the work carried out with regard to weights in argumentation systems
[27] could also be applied in our context.
• Moreover, we assume that the agents are willing to share their information
about the trust they have in other agents. It would be interesting to devise
some form of incentives for the agents to do so.
• And finally, agents are assumed to be constantly updating their information
as they learn more about the others, which argues for adding a time element
to the framework to make it dynamic. The concept of transitivity and there-
fore our trust-induced inference rules would be affected by this dynamism,
as such the model might need to keep track of induced relationships so that
they could be backtracked when changes in the society occur. This would
allow the agent to form coalitions when it is advantageous to them or to bet-
ter select trustworthy and competent agents to work together, allowing for a
greater stability in the society.
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This point also relates with having the possibility to define degrees of trust
and distrust. Being able to monitor changes in these values could give agents
important insight into the dynamics of the social relationships in the society
and help them to revise their own beliefs when these are based, for example,
on inferred relationships.
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